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Abstract

Feature modeling and cluster analysis of malicious Web traﬃc
by
Ana Dimitrijevikj
Many attackers ﬁnd Web applications to be attractive targets since they are widely
used and have many vulnerabilities to exploit. The goal of this thesis is to study patterns of
attacker activities on typical Web based systems using four data sets collected by honeypots,
each in duration of almost four months. The contributions of our work include cluster analysis
and modeling the features of the malicious Web traﬃc. Some of our main conclusions are:
(1) Features of malicious sessions, such as Number of Requests, Bytes Transferred, and
Duration, follow skewed distributions, including heavy-tailed. (2) Number of requests per
unique attacker follows skewed distributions, including heavy-tailed, with a small number of
attackers submitting most of the malicious traﬃc. (3) Cluster analysis provides an eﬃcient
way to distinguish between attack sessions and vulnerability scan sessions.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Many companies use Web Applications to run their businesses. These Web Applications
have many vulnerabilities that can be exploited by attackers. A report from SANS [45]
concludes that 60% of the total attack attempts observed on the Internet were against Web
applications. The harm of having the Web application compromised can have a huge impact
on the company’s business since it could potentially lose clients as their information is being
stolen by attackers. [46] explains that there are two types of trends to compromise a Web
server. The ﬁrst trend is brute force password guessing attacks against Microsoft SQL, FTP,
and SSH servers, and the second trend consists of the three most popular attacks against
Web sites: SQL Injection, Cross-site Scripting and PHP File Include attacks. According to
[45], SQL injection and Cross-Site Scripting ﬂaws in open-source applications account for
more than 80% of the vulnerabilities being discovered.
The second generation of the World Wide Web (WWW) or Web 2.0 is a generation
in which dynamic and sharable content Web pages were introduced. Examples of such
Web-applications are: Wikipedia, BlogSpot, Facebook, and so on. However, these Web 2.0
applications face many security problems and one in particular that stands out is spam.
According to [11], spam is done by automatically posting random comments or promoting
commercial services to blogs, wikis and so on. In fact, any web application that accepts and
displays hyperlinks is potentially a target to spam. A report by Sophos in 2008 concluded
that every 3 seconds new spam-related webpage is created [37].
The fact that most attackers ﬁnd Web Applications attractive targets to attack motivates
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us to analyze attacker activities on Web-based systems. In this thesis, the goal is to learn
patterns and characteristics of attacker activities on typical Web based systems using data
collected by honeypots [38], [35] which appear to be legitimate servers, but were actually
collecting information on attacker activity. The main purpose of honeypots is to collect
information. We use honeypots to install Web Applications and collect malicious traﬃc. The
Web Applications on our honeypots are conﬁgured in a three-tier architecture consisting of
a web server, application server and a back-end database.
Thus, having a Web-based system with meaningful functionality running on our honeypots makes more sense than having just independent applications installed. Older versions
of the applications were installed, each with a known set of vulnerabilities. The assumption
is that the older versions of the applications along with the type of applications will make
the honeypots attractive targets for attackers.
The Web applications which are installed on our honeypots are:
• phpMyAdmin is a type of a Web based database administration application used to
handle the administration of a database over the Web. phpMyAdmin [40] is an open
source tool which is written in PHP and is used as a Web based front-end to MySQL.
• WordPress [49] is Web software used to create websites or blogs. Thus, it is a PHPbased open source blogging software. Blogs are web sites where users post their
thoughts, opinions and they follow the principles of Web 2.0.
• Mediawiki [32] is an PHP-based open source wiki software that is widely used across
the Internet. Wikis are Web applications in which users collaborate to generate an
online encyclopedia such as Wikipedia.
The data collected through the application traﬃc logs from our honeypots is grouped
into four data sets: WebDBAdmin I, Web 2.0 I, WebDBAdmin II and Web 2.0 II. The data
is in a form of Web Sessions, each deﬁned as a sequence of requests issued from the same
user during a single visit to the Web System. In order to characterize attacker behavior, we
do formal inferential statistical analysis and cluster analyzes of the malicious Web sessions
observed on our honeypots. In particular, we model the tails of Web session features with
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heavy-tailed distributions since most of the feature values are small, and only a few are big.
We observed and modeled the phenomenon of having few attackers generating most of the
malicious traﬃc on our honeypots. Finally, we do cluster analysis of Web sessions in order
to explore whether we can separate attacks from vulnerability scans.
This work is a part of larger eﬀort aimed at Improving Web Quality through an Integrated
Approach together with [38] and [35]. The main contributions of this thesis are as follows:
• We carried out statistical analysis of the attackers activities, including several features
of malicious Web sessions as well as analyzing the number of sessions and request per
unique source attacker. Unlike the statistical characterization of the network traﬃc
which has a long tradition (see for example [19], [22]), only very few attempts were
made to statistically model some aspects of malicious traﬃc, such as [24], [6]. Neither
of these studies included Web 2.0 applications and analysis of malicious Web sessions.
• We applied cluster analysis of malicious Web traﬃc in order to separate Attacks from
Vulnerability scans sessions. Cluster analysis of malicious traﬃc collected from honeypots in the past was considered only in [9]. However, the work in [9] is diﬀerent from
ours since it is focused on distinguishing only between attacks aimed at port 445 and
using only 3 clusters. In our work, we cluster sessions aimed at Web 2.0 applications
as well as phpMyAdmin applications, and the purpose of the analysis is to distinguish
between attacks and vulnerability scans Web sessions.
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the related work. The experimental
approach and data description is explained in Chapter 3. The statistical characterization of
Web session features is presented in Chapter 4, which is followed by cluster analyzes of Web
sessions in Chapter 5. Finally, conclusions are given in Chapter 6.

4

Chapter 2
Related Work & Our Contributions
In this section, ﬁrst we review papers that discuss modeling of some aspects of malicious
traﬃc. Then, we review papers that use clustering approaches for Internet traﬃc classiﬁcation, i.e. clustering non-malicious traﬃc. Next, we review papers that use clustering based
anomaly detection techniques i.e. clustering malicious and non-malicious traﬃc, and ﬁnally
we address papers that cluster only malicious traﬃc.

2.1
2.1.1

Related Work
Modeling some aspects of malicious traﬃc

In this subsection, we review papers which discuss modeling of some aspects of malicious
traﬃc.
In [24], the authors discuss modeling of attacks based on the data collected from the
honeypots deployed. The authors account the attacks observed on 14 honeypot platforms
(the total number of attacks 816476). The analysis presented in [24] included using linear
regression to model the number of attacks per unit of time as a function of attacks originating
from a single country, and ﬁtting a mixture of exponential and Pareto distributions to model
the time between two consecutive attacks.
The work presented in [6] compared the data collected by Leurre.com and two highinteraction honeypots which ran several unrelated applications. The analysis was based on
the traﬃc at network layer and included distribution ﬁtting of the time between the ﬁrst
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packet exchanges from reappearing IPs.
In [6], the authors also showed that a small number of attackers for each given network
are responsible for a very large amount of the malicious traﬃc.

2.1.2

Clustering approaches for Internet Traﬃc Classiﬁcation

In this subsection, we review papers in which cluster analysis was used to separate traﬃc
into a number of network applications; that is, classes. The main types of network applications analyzed were HTTP, P2P, SMTP, POP3, Telnet, DNS and FTP, among others.
These papers discuss several types of approaches used to identify an application: port-based,
payload-based, and machine learning-based approaches. Port-based method is a traditional
method that relies on mapping a known port number to a speciﬁc application. For example, HTTP traﬃc uses port 80, FTP port 21, and so on. However, P2P applications that
are popular nowadays use dynamic port numbers to disguise their traﬃc or masquerade as
well-known applications. In payload-based approach, packet payloads are analyzed to see
if they contain speciﬁc signatures of known applications. This method fails to detect the
application traﬃc when payloads are being encrypted. For example, P2P applications use
encryption. Also, this method can only identify applications whose speciﬁc signatures are
known. We review papers that use machine-learning approach for application identiﬁcation,
speciﬁcally unsupervised techniques to identify applications using ﬂow features. The idea
behind this approach is that applications usually send data in some pattern that can be
used for identiﬁcation. In order to ﬁnd these patterns, network ﬂow statistics (features)
were being extracted. Clustering was used for classifying traﬃc using only transport layer
statistics.
The data used in [50], was collected by a high-performance network monitor at a research
facility. The goal was to classify diﬀerent network ﬂows and specify their application types.
Flow was deﬁned as series of packet exchanges between two hosts, identiﬁed by a 5-tuple
(source IP address, source port, destination IP address, destination port, application protocol). Some of the ﬂow features used were: the number of total packets-b-a (where ‘a’ is the
client and ‘b’ is server), the number of actual data bytes-b-a, the number of pushed data
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packets-a-b, size of the mean IPpackcet-a-b etc. The classes, that is, the applications identiﬁed, were WWW, mail, P2P, database, multimedia, etc. Since the number of features used
to describe a ﬂow can be several hundred, in [50] several feature selection and search techniques were used. Thus, algorithms [20] such as Correlation-based Feature Selection (CFS),
Consistency-based subset evaluation, Information gain attribute evaluation were used for
feature selection. Furthermore, algorithms such as backward and forward greedy search,
Best First, and Ranker for searching were used for feature search techniques. Features that
were frequent in the selected feature subsets were believed to be better at discriminating
the classes. K-means algorithm was used to classify network traﬃc by application. The
performance metrics used were recall and the overall accuracy. The results showed that the
overall accuracy of K-means was up to 80%, and after a log transformation, the accuracy
was improved to 90% or more. Also, the results showed that after log transformation, the
recall value increased. The recall value of each class increased considerably; for example, 7
out of 11 classes had recall above 80%. The overall conclusion was that K-means performed
better on log transformed data rather than on original data.
In [12], the authors analyzed data from two empirical traces: one publicly available
Internet traﬃc trace from the University of Auckland and the other trace collected from
the University of Calgary. The goal was to use clustering algorithms to identify groups of
traﬃc based on transport layer statistics. Some of the statistical ﬂow characteristics used
were number of packets, mean packet size, number of bytes transferred, mean inter-arrival
time of packets and so forth, whereas the classes were DNS, FTP, HTTP, IRC, LIMEWIRE,
NNTP, POP3, etc. The following clustering algorithms were compared: K-means, DBSCAN
[15] and Autoclass [7]. The approach was based on two phases. In the ﬁrst phase, the
clustering algorithm clusters the data. Then, these set of clusters were labeled to represent
the classiﬁcation model. A cluster is labeled by a traﬃc class that makes up the majority
of its connections. The number of correctly classiﬁed connections in a cluster was refereed
to as the True Positives (TP). Then overall accuracy was determined by the portion of the
total TP for all clusters out of the total number of connections.
The overall accuracy of K-Means was approximately 49% for the Auckland IV data sets
and 67% for the Calgary data sets. However, with a higher number of clusters, the accuracy
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was increased. For example, when K was 500 the overall accuracy was 80%. One problem
with this is the possibility of over-ﬁtting the data. The overall accuracy of the DBSCAN
algorithm was from 59.5% to 75.6% for the Auckland IV data sets and from 32.0% to 72.0%
for the Calgary data sets. Finally, AutoClass was 92.4% and 88.7% accurate on the Auckland
IV and Calgary data sets, respectively. Also, precision values were calculated for the three
algorithms using the Calgary data set. The results showed that seven out of nine traﬃc
classes had average precision values over 95%.
The analysis presented in [14] was very similar to the analysis in [12]. In [14], the authors
proposed a semi-supervised learning method for traﬃc classiﬁcation that relied on the ﬂow
statistics to classify traﬃc. The clustering algorithm used was K-means. As in [12], clustering
of the ﬂows was done ﬁrst, followed by mapping of the clusters to the classes (applications).
The data set in the ﬁrst experiment was unlabeled. Then, after the clusters were created,
a few ﬂows from each clusters were randomly selected and labeled and these labeled ﬂows
were the basis for mapping clusters to applications. The results showed that for K=400 and
two labeled ﬂows per cluster, the attained ﬂow accuracy was 94%. The second experiment
included labeled ﬂows and these labeled ﬂows were mixed with a varying number of unlabeled
ﬂows. The results showed that by increasing the number of unlabeled ﬂows in a data set
together with the ﬁxed labeled ﬂows, the precision was also increased to above 90%.
The work in [31] used data of 6-hour Auckland - VI trace. The packets in this trace were
divided into bi-directional ﬂows. Flow features used were interarrival statistics, byte counts,
connection duration, the number of transactions between transaction mode and bulk transfer
mode, etc. The classes, that is, the applications used, were HTTP, FTP, SMTP, IMAP, NTP
and DNS. EM (Expectation-Maximization) clustering algorithm was used to group traﬃc
ﬂows into clusters. The number of clusters was found automatically by cross-validation, so
the best model (the number of clusters) was used. The algorithm separated the ﬂows by
their traﬃc type (bulk transfer, small transactions, multiple transactions, etc.). However, the
algorithm was not successful in identifying individual applications as it was expected since
individual applications behaved diﬀerently across diﬀerent connections. Therefore, they did
not estimate the accuracy of the classiﬁcation.
The analysis presented in [13] was based on the Auckland IV and Auckland VI publicly
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available data [3]. The features used for the connections were number of packets, mean packet
size, ﬂow duration, mean inter-arrival time of packets, etc. Some of the traﬃc classes were
HTTP, SMTP, DNS, IRC, POP3, FTP, Limewire, etc. An EM clustering technique called
AutoClass was used and the results from this technique were compared with a previously
applied supervised machine learning approach, the Naive Bayes classiﬁer. Three metrics were
used to measure the eﬀectiveness of the algorithms: precision, recall and overall accuracy.
The results showed that for the Naive Bayes classiﬁer, on average, the precision and recall for
majority of the traﬃc classes was above 80%. As for the AutoClass approach, the precision
and recall values were around 91%. The AutoClass had an overall accuracy of 91.2% while the
Naive Bayes had an accuracy of 82.5%. Therefore, the results showed that the unsupervised
technique outperformed the supervised by up to 9%.
In [5], the authors used one hour packet trace of TCP ﬂows from an university network.
The goal was to identify an application associated with a TCP ﬂow. To do so, the information
in the header of the ﬁrst 5 packets of the ﬂow was used, which captured the application
negotiating phase. The applications (classes) used were: Edonkey, FTP, HTTP, Kazaa,
POP3 etc. K-means clustering algorithm was used to identify the application associated
with the TCP connection (ﬂow). The results showed that more than 80 % of total ﬂows of
all of the applications were correctly identiﬁed by using the ﬁrst ﬁve packets of each TCP
ﬂow.
The work presented in [51] used three 24-hour traﬃc traces, that is, Aukcland VI, LeipzigII, and NZIX-II. Packets were classiﬁed into ﬂows and ﬂow characteristics such as packet
inter-arrival time, packet mean length and variance, ﬂow size in bytes and ﬂow duration
were computed. Feature selection techniques such as sequential forward selection (SFS) was
used to examine the inﬂuence of diﬀerent features. The results showed that packet length
statistics was preferred over inter-arrival times statistics. The applications(classes) used were
FTP, TELNET, SMTP, DNS, HTTP, AOL messenger, Napster, Half-life. An unsupervised
machine learning technique called Autoclass (which is an unsupervised Bayesian classiﬁer)
was used to determine the best clusters set from the training data. The authors mapped
each class to the application that was dominating the class. The results showed that the
average accuracy across all traces was 86.5%. The false positive rate per application was also
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calculated. The results showed that the FTP, TELNET and Web traﬃc have the highest
percentage of false positives.

2.1.3

Cluster analysis for anomaly detection

In this subsection, we review papers that use clustering techniques on data sets that
contain both normal and malicious traﬃc. The goal of these papers was to identify anomalies
within the traﬃc such as malicious attack traﬃc.
In [27], Denial-of-Service attacks and Network Probe attacks were selected from DARPA
1998 [10] intrusion detection data. Also, portions of normal network traﬃc were used from
the DARPA data sets. The goal was to describe a method for detecting these attacks using
Principal Component Analysis (PCA). Therefore, four data sets were used to represent the
attack types and three data sets to represent normal traﬃc. For each data set, 300 packets
were collected and processed to extract the IP header information to produce 300 feature
vectors. Each packet header was represented by a 12 dimensional feature vector. Principal
Component Analysis was used to reduce the dimensionality of the feature vectors and also to
provide visualization and analysis of the data. The ﬁrst two principal components and their
loading values were calculated along with other statistics. The principal component loadings
are the coeﬃcients of the principal components transformation and provide a summary of
the inﬂuence of the original variables on the principal components. The highest loading
values on the two components were used. The results showed that the loading values of the
features on the ﬁrst and second principal components can be used to identify an attack. For
normal traﬃc, loading values appeared to be similar, while during an attack the loading
values diﬀered signiﬁcantly for the ﬁrst two principal components.
The analysis presented in [36] included ﬂow records of both normal and anomalous traﬃc
exported by routers and network monitors using Cisco Netﬂow protocol. The features of a
ﬂow were total number of packets and bytes transmitted at speciﬁc time intervals and the
number of unique source destination pairs observed in the considered time interval. K-means
clustering algorithm was used to divide the data into two clusters (K = 2); that is, normal
and anomalous clusters. If the resulting centroids of the normal and anomalous clusters

Ana Dimitrijevikj

Chapter 2. Related Work & Our Contributions

10

were very close to each other, it was concluded that there were no traﬃc anomalies in the
analyzed data. Therefore, the centroids of the clusters were used to detect anomalies in the
data. For example, K-means was applied to services such as HTTP, FTP and SSH and the
resulting centroids were very close to each other indicating that there were no anomalies in
the analyzed data. When, UDP traﬃc was analyzed, the resulting centroids were not close
to each other, and anomalous traﬃc was detected.
In [52] the data used was network traﬃc data sets DARPA 1998. 105 feature dimensions
were used and scaled to be within [0,1] interval. Several centroid-based algorithms such as
K-means, Mixture of Spherical Gaussians [4], Self-Organizing Maps (SOM) [25] and NeuralGas [30] were used to demonstrate the advantages of clustering-based attack detection. To
estimate the performance of the cluster algorithms, mean square error (mse), average purity
and the runtime for each cluster algorithm was calculated. For evaluating the intrusion
detection results, false positive rate, attack detection rate (recall) and overall accuracy were
estimated too. For the whole data set consisting of 109,910 instances, the overall accuracy
was 93.6%, false positive rate was 3.6% and the recall was 72%. The mse, average purity and
run time for each clustering algorithm was calculated in case for 100 and 200 clusters. When
k =100 the results showed that the kmo and Neural-Gas algorithms performed signiﬁcantly
better than the other methods in terms of mse and average purity. However, kmo achieved
the same high quality with much less run time. Clustering results from 100 clusters and 200
clusters were compared and it was concluded that k-means and SOM were computationally
eﬃcient. The results also showed that for 100 clusters, the SOM was the worst for the false
positive rates, and for 200 clusters, all algorithms performed well. For example, more than
50% of attacks were detected with a false positive rate of almost 0.
The data used in [28] was from two backbone networks (Abilene and Geant). Traﬃc
features such as source address, destination address, source port and destination port were
extracted from the header of the packet. The anomaly classes used were: DoS, port scan,
network scan, worms etc. The goal was to ﬁnd methods capable of detecting diverse set of
network anomalies with high detection rate and low false alarm rate. Hierarchical agglomerative clustering and K-means clustering with Euclidian distance ware used to analyze and
categorize anomalies. Clustering was used to get a better understanding of the nature of the
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anomalies that have been detected and to possibly discover new anomaly types. The results
of performing hierarchical clustering for 10 clusters on the 3-week Geant data set showed
that the clusters were consistent, meaning that most of the points within a cluster had the
same label.

2.1.4

Clustering malicious traﬃc

In this subsection, we review papers that use cluster analysis on malicious traﬃc only,
which are most related to our work.
The work presented in [9] analyzed malicious activity that targeted port 445. The analyzes was done on data collected from two honeypots. Port scans and vulnerability scans were
separated from the malicious activity, allowing distinction between attacks only. Therefore,
their goal was to ﬁnd characteristics that would separate attacks within the attack data.
Attack characteristics used were: attack duration, number of packets, number of bytes, message lengths and so forth. Three classes of attacks were identiﬁed when analyzing the attack
messages, and therefore K=3 was used for the K-means algorithm with Euclidian distance.
The results showed that number of bytes was the best characteristic for separating attacks
with only 2% of incorrectly clustered instances.
The data set used in [39] consisted of malware samples collected in a period of six months
from diﬀerent malware sources such as MWCollect [8], Malfease [42] and commercial malware
feeds. The authors proposed a novel behavioral malware clustering system that can discover
similarities among diﬀerent malware samples that may not be captured by the current anti
virus programs. The idea was that even thought there are many variants of the same
malware, they all exhibit similar malicious activities. Therefore, their goal was to cluster
malware samples according to similarities in their malicious behavior. The output of the
authors analysis is hoped to be the input to algorithms that generate network signatures.
The authors proposed a cluster process consisting of Coarse-grained Clustering, Fine-grained
Clustering and Cluster merging. In the ﬁrst phase, the Coarse-grained Clustering clusters the
malware samples based on the following features: total number of HTTP requests generated
by the malware, the number of GET requests, the number of POST requests, average length
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of URLs, average number of parameters in the request and so on. This phase splits the
malware into “large” (coarse-grained) clusters. In the second phase, that is, the ﬁne-grained
clustering, the clusters were further split into smaller groups. Finally, the cluster merging
phase merges the clusters of malware that exhibit similar HTTP behavior. In all three
phases, a single-linkage hierarchial clustering was used. As for the cluster validity, the
authors propose a new approach based on a measure of the cohesion of each cluster and the
separation among diﬀerent clusters. The results showed that the majority of the clusters were
compact and well separated from each other. The authors also discussed how their method
could help the automatic generation of network signatures. A signature set was extracted
from each of the clusters and the ability to detect the future malware was measured. All the
signature sets were able to detect around 20% to 53% of future malwares that the current
anti virus scanners were not able to detect.

2.2

The Contributions of this Thesis

The contributions of this thesis are as follows:
• We perform statistical analysis of attacker activities, such as modeling several features
of malicious Web sessions and the also modeling the arrival of sessions and requests
originating from a unique attacker. It appears that there were only very few attempts
to statistically model some aspects of malicious traﬃc, such as [24], and [6]. Neither
of these studies included Web 2.0 applications and analysis of malicious Web sessions.
• In this thesis we perform cluster analysis on malicious Web traﬃc which is represented
by malicious Web sessions collected from our honeypots, with speciﬁc focus on distinguishing between vulnerability scan sessions and attack sessions. None of the related
work have focused on these aspects of the malicious traﬃc. The goal of the related
work that discuss cluster analysis of normal traﬃc was to classify diﬀerent network
ﬂows and specify their application, whereas the goal of the related works that discuss
clustering techniques on data sets that contain both normal and malicious traﬃc was
to identify anomalies within the traﬃc such as malicious attack traﬃc. Only a few
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papers apply cluster analysis on malicious traﬃc only. The authors in [9] analyzed
malicious activity that targeted port 445. Port scans and vulnerability scans were separated from the malicious activity and their goal was to ﬁnd characteristics that would
separate attacks within the attack data.
• In our work we compare the performance of the K-means algorithm when all session
features are used and when features are selected using several feature selection methods.
Only few related works that use cluster analysis use formal feature selection techniques.
In [50] several feature selection and search techniques were used such as Information
gain attribute evaluation. In [51], Sequential forward selection was used for feature
selection.
• We calculate the following performance measures of the K-means algorithms: probability of detection, probability of false alarm, precision, balance, and overall accuracy.
Most of the related work estimates a subset of these measures. Furthermore, none
of the related work that discuss cluster analysis have addressed the balance measure.
The balance measure is important since it shows the balance between the probability
of false alarm and the probability of detection. Ideally, a learner would have 100%
probability of detecting an attack and 0% probability of false alarm, a result which is
rarely achieved in reality. This is why we calculate the balance, which tells us how
close the learner is to the ideal spot (of having 0% probability of false alarm and 100%
probability of detection of attack).

14

Chapter 3
Experimental Approach and Data
Description
In this chapter, we describe the experimental set up used in our work and the data sets
collected for the analysis.

3.1

Honeypots

A honeypot is a computer which is connected to a network but it is not intended to
be used by anyone. If anyone attempts to use the machine, it is probably an attempt to
attack the machine [1]. To analyze attacker behavior on Web based systems, we developed
and deployed three diﬀerent honeypot conﬁgurations (set-ups) [16], [18]. Each conﬁguration
was installed on two identical honeypots, one advertised and the other unadvertised. The
honeypot was advertised by using a technique called “transparent linking”. This technique
involves placing an “invisible” link that points to the honeypot on a regular public Web
page. Since the link is invisible, it cannot be accessed by a regular user surﬁng the Web
page, but it can be reached by Web spiders crawling that page [21]. By having the honeypot
indexed by search engines we allow for attacks based on search engines. The IP address
of the unadvertised honeypot, as the name applies, was not advertised anywhere on the
Web. The unadvertised honeypot could only be reached by an IP-based strategy when an
attacker scans a range of IP addresses. In this thesis, the analysis is focused only on traﬃc
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collected from the advertised honeypots since the traﬃc from the unadvertised honeypot
was signiﬁcantly smaller. The observation from our experiments is that the attackers use
search-engines to ﬁnd the types and versions of applications that are installed, instead of
performing random scans, especially for honeypots running Web 2.0 applications [18].
To summarize, each honeypot ran a Web-based system with a three-tier architecture
consisting of Web server as a front-end, an application server, and database server as a backend. The three diﬀerent conﬁgurations developed as a part of a wider project, described in
details in [38], [35] are as follows.
Two (advertised and unadvertised) honeypots were running on Linux operating system
with Apache Web Server, PHP as an Application Server, and phpMyAdmin as a Web Application used as a front-end of an MySQL database. In addition, OpenSSH server and client
were installed to allow remote login, as it is typical for many Web systems. There was only
one SSH user account, which was set up with a strong password. The MySQL server is the
only other application with login information, but no user accounts in the MySQL server
were accessible to remote systems. However, attackers could still attempt to login to the
MySQL server via the phpMyAdmin Web page. WebDBAdmin I is the name of the data
set consisting of malicious traﬃc collected from the advertised honeypot during the period
of June 2 to September 28, 2008.
The conﬁguration of the other two honeypots had Windows XP operating system installed
with IIS Web Server, PHP as an Application Server, and phpMyadmin as a Web Application
used as a front-end of an MySQL database. WebDBAdmin II is the name of the data set
consisting of malicious traﬃc collected from this advertised honeypot during the period of
August 17, 2009 to January 17, 2010.
Another two honeypots (advertised and unadvertised) were running on Windows XP
operating system with Microsoft IIS Web Server, PHP as an Application Server and Blog
and Wiki as Web 2.0 Applications, with MySQL database. For each Web application a
random text generator was used to generate random content so that the attackers would
think the applications were actually being actively used. Multiple users with strong password
accounts were created for each application. In Wordpress, anonymous users were allowed to
post comments to blog entries. In MediaWiki, anonymous users had the same permission
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level as logged in users and were allowed to post and edit entries [35].From this advertised
honeypot, we have two datasets Web 2.0 I and Web 2.0 II which were collected in diﬀerent
time periods. The malicious traﬃc in Web 2.0 I were collected from March 30 until July 26,
2009, whereas the traﬃc in Web 2.0 II was collected from August 17, 2009 until January 17,
2010.
All honeypot conﬁgurations have a honeywall which acts as a brigding ﬁrewall between
the honeypots and the Internet. Any traﬃc going to or from the honeypots passes through
the honeywall which logs all the packets using TCPDump and forwards the packets without
modiﬁng the hop count of the packets. This makes the honeywall undetectable. Besides
the network traﬃc, the application logs of various components running on our honeypots
are captured too. These logs are stored in a central data repository which runs on a separate physical host. It should be mentioned that we analyzed only incoming traﬃc since the
outgoing traﬃc from the honeypots consisted only of responses to requests sent to the honeypots. Also, non-malicious traﬃc consisting of system management traﬃc and legitimate
Web crawlers (such as Google) was removed from all honeypot data.

3.2

Deﬁnition of Web Session

The malicious traﬃc analyzed in this thesis is in form of Web sessions. A Web session
is deﬁned as a sequence of requests issued from the same user during a single visit to the
Web Application. Thus, a Web session has multiple Web requests from the same source
IP address within a given threshold. In order to analyze the Web sessions observed on the
honeypots, scripts were developed by [19], [17], [35], [38] to extract data from Web server
logs (Apache and IIS). The output of the tool was a csv ﬁle in which each row was a distinct
Web Session extracted from Web server log.
Upon detailed investigation of the requests within a Web session, each Web session was
labeled as an attack or vulnerability scan on a Web based system. A session is labeled as
an Attack if and only if there is at least one request used to attempt to exploit a speciﬁc
vulnerability in a system. A session is labeled as Vulnerability Scan if and only if all requests
are used to check for speciﬁc vulnerabilities in a system.
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Web Session Features

In this section we explain the features of a Web session. Let X be a data set consisting
of n Web sessions observed on a particular Web System, X= {x1 , ..., xn } , where xi is a
data point that represents a session. Furthermore, each Web session is characterized by
43 diﬀerent features xi = (f1 , ..., f43 ). Scripts were developed for extracting the features of
each Web session [38]. Also, more details regarding the features can be found in [38]. In
this thesis, we only give a list of the features, with brief descriptions. Each Web session is
characterized by the following features:
1. Number of requests
2. Bytes transferred
3. Duration in seconds
4. Mean time between requests
5. Median time between requests
6. Minimum time between requests
7. Maximum time between requests
8. Standard Deviation of Time Between Requests
9. Number of requests with GET method type
10. Number of requests with POST method type
11. Number of requests with OPTIONS method type
12. Number of requests with HEAD method type
13. Number of requests with PROPFIND method type
14. Number of requests with other method types, such as: PUT, DELETE, TRACE, CONNECT
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15. Number of requests to Picture files (extensions like .jpeg, .jpg, .gif, .ico, .png, etc.)
16. Number of requests to Video files (extensions like .avi, .mpg, .wmv, etc)
17. Number of requests to static Application files (extensions like .html, .htm)
18. Number of requests to dynamic Application files (php, .asp, etc.)
19. Number of requests to Text files (extensions like .txt, .ini, .css, etc.)
20. Number of requests with 1xx status code (Informational status)
21. Number of requests with 2xx status code (Success status)
22. Number of requests with 3xx status code (Redirection status)
23. Number of requests with 4xx status code (Client Error)
24. Number of requests with 5xx status code (Server Error)
The following features are based on the length (measured in number of characters) of
the request substring from the Web server access log. One example of a request string is:
“GET //phpMyAdmin//scripts/setup.php HTTP/1.1”. The length of a substring of
this request string which is used in our analysis is: “//phpMyAdmin//scripts/setup.php”.
25. Mean Length of all request substrings (within a session)
26. Median Length of all request substrings
27. Minimum Length is the length of the shortest request substring
28. Maximum Length is the length of the longest request substring
29. Standard Deviation of Length of all the request substring
The following ﬁve features are based on the request parameters. HTTP request parameters are usually used to pass data in web applications, that is, when data needs to
be passed from the client to the server. One example of a request used to pass parameters is: “http://www.examplesite.com/login?username=foo&password=bar” Usually
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the number of parameters passed are separated with ampersand “&” or semicolon ”:”.
The number of parameters passed with this example request is 2.
30. Mean Number of Parameters passed to an application (within a session)
31. Median Number of Parameters passed to an application
32. Minimum Number of Parameters passed to an application
33. Maximum Number of Parameters passed to an application
34. Standard Deviation of Number of Parameters passed to an application
35. robots.txt: whether a robots.txt ﬁle was been accessed in any request
36. Night: whether the session was between 12am to 8am (local time)
37. Remote Sites Injected - whether there is a remote site injection in at least one request
38. Semicolon Used - whether a semicolon was used to divide the multiple passed attributes
to an application in in some of the requests
The following features are based on whether there is any speciﬁc characters within a
request string which might be associated with malicious activity.
39. Unsafe Characters - whether there is a string containing suspicious encoding in some
of the requests
40. Reserved Characters indicates whether a reserved character was used in some of the
requests
41. ASCII Control Characters indicates weather an ASCII control character was used in
some of the requests
42. Non ASCII Control Characters indicates weather a Non ASCII control character was
used in some of the requests
43. Invalid Characters - whether invalid encoding was used in some of the requests
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Types of attackers’ activities

In this section, we present descriptive statistics of each data set. Table 3.1 presents what
the attackers did in the Web sessions of each data set.
The WebDBAdmin I data set contains 214 Web Sessions, 185 (86.45%) of which were
labeled as vulnerability scans and 29 (13.55%) were labeled as attacks. The most dominant
types of vulnerability scans were sessions labeled as “phpMyAdmin” and “Static and phpMyadmin”. Among the 29 sessions that were labeled as attacks, 18 were password cracking
of phpMyAdmin user accounts.
The Web 2.0 I data set contains 1117 Web Sessions, 824 (73.77%) of which were labeled as
vulnerability scans and 293, (26.23%) were labeled as attacks. Among the sessions that were
labeled as vulnerability scans, the most dominant types of scans were labeled as “Wiki”.
Another dominant type of scan was when attackers were ﬁngerprinting (accessing) Blog
and/or Wiki directly or through the homepage. The most frequent type of attack observed
in this data set was Spam on Wiki with 249 sessions out of 293 attack sessions.
The WebDBAdmin II data set contains 549 Web sessions, 513 (93.44%) of which were labeled as vulnerability scans and only 39 (6.56%) were labeled as attacks. Among the sessions
that were labeled as vulnerability scans the most frequent were sessions further labeled as
Static, phpMyAdmin and phpMyAdmin and Static, in which attackers were ﬁngerprinting
(accessing) the Static and/or phpMyAdmin page. Among the 36 sessions that were labeled
as attacks, 35 were labeled as “other attacks”. These other attacks are diﬀerent from attacks
such as RFI, XSS, SQL injection, and some of them are unknown and this is why they are
classiﬁed as other attacks.
The Web 2.0 II data set contains 4785 Web sessions, 2059 (43.03%) of which were labeled
as vulnerability scans and 2726 (56.97%) were labeled as attacks. Among the types of scans
the most frequent were sessions in which browsed static content (html pages, pictures, and
video ﬁles) and ﬁngerprinting (accessing) Blog or Wiki. Among the 2726 sessions that were
labeled as attacks, 1411 were Spam on Blog and 1055 were Spam on Wiki.
• As it can be seen from Figure 3.1, data set Web 2.0 II has the most sessions compared
to the other data sets. There were more sessions labeled as vulnerability scans than

Ana Dimitrijevikj

Chapter 3. Experimental Approach and Data Description

Figure 3.1: Web sessions in data sets

21

Figure 3.2: Web requests in data sets

attacks in all data sets, except for the Web 2.0 II data set.
• Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of the number of attack requests and vulnerability
scan requests for each data set. All data sets have more attack requests than vulnerability scans except for the WebDBAdmin II data set. It is interesting to note that
for the WebDBAdmin I and Web 2.0 I data sets, even though there are more attack
requests than vulnerability scan requests, the number of vulnerability scan sessions are
dominating. This is because a few attack sessions contain many number of requests.
For example, for the WebDBAdmin I data set, 5 sessions from the e-mail harvesting
category contain 245 attack requests, or 18 sessions labeled as password cracking phpmyadmin user accounts have 260 requests. Similarly, the 4 sessions from data set Web
2.0 I that are labeled as DoS attack have 3724 requests.
• The majority of attacks that we observed in data set WebDBAdmin I were Password
cracking of phpMyAdmin user accounts.
• The majority of attacks that we observed in the Web 2.0 I data set were Spam on
Wiki; that is, there were 249 Spam on Wiki sessions out of the 293 attack sessions.
Spam on Wiki was also observed in 1055 sessions out of the 2726 attack sessions in the
Web 2.0 II data set.
• The most frequent attacks in the Web 2.0 II data set were Spam on Blog (approximately
29%). This type of spam was not nearly as frequent as in the Web 2.0 I data set (only
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0.00%

0

0.00%

71

1.48%

5
2.34%
0
0.00%
0
0.00%
0
0.00%
1
0.47%
0
0.00%
5
2.34%
214 100.00%

0
0.00%
23
2.06%
249
22.29%
4
0.36%
2
0.18%
2
0.18%
0
0.00%
1117 100.00%

0
0.00%
0
0.00%
0
0.00%
1
0.18%
0
0.00%
0
0.00%
35
6.38%
549 100.00%

0
0.00%
1411
29.49%
1055
22.05%
5
0.10%
0
0.00%
11
0.23%
172
3.59%
4785 100.00%

Table 3.1: Summary of Web Sessions for all data sets
around 2%).
• Posting spam messages dominated among the attack sessions on both Web 2.0 data
sets. We observed the trend that Spam is a major problem for many servers that host
Web 2.0 applications due to their interactive nature. In our case, on both Wiki and
Blog, attackers posted text and often links to other Web sites. It is interesting to note
that no spam ended on the unadvertised server which indicates the use of search-based
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strategies.
• Denial of Service (DoS) attack was observed only in the Web 2.0 I data set. This
attack was based on the Microsoft IIS vulnerability, but since this vulnerability was
ﬁxed in Windows XP SP1 which ran on our honeypots, the attack was unsuccessful.
The attacker used IP-based strategy to reach the servers and although the number
of sessions was small, it dominated the number of requests on both advertised and
unadvertised servers.
• Attackers browsing static content such as html pages, pictures, and video ﬁles and
ﬁngerprinting (accessing) Blog and/or Wiki ware observed on both Web 2.0 I and Web
2.0 II data sets.

24

Chapter 4
Statistical characterization of Session
Features
Modeling malicious traﬃc seems interesting since it can help us characterize attacker
behavior. In this chapter, we analyze the following malicious Web session features: Duration,
Number of Requests per session, and Bytes Transferred per session. The goal is to study
whether these features follow heavy-tailed distributions. Also, we explore whether these
features are correlated. Furthermore, we explore whether the number of request and sessions
originated from unique source IP (attackers) follow heavy-tailed distributions. Finally, we
test whether there is any diﬀerence in attackers’ behavior observed in the four data sets of
sessions.

4.1

Background on ﬁtting a heavy-tailed distribution

Statistical characterization of network traﬃc has a long tradition. In [19], heavy-tailed
distributions were used to describe some features of normal traﬃc. It appears that there
were only very few attempts to statistically model aspects of malicious traﬃc, such as the
distribution of the time between visits of reappearing IPs in [6].
Our interest is to see if the “tails” of malicious Web session features can be modeled with
heavy-tailed distributions. Practically, this means that most of the feature values are small,
however there are a few feature values that are much higher than the typical feature values.
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These few values are making the tail to the right of the feature distribution. For example,
most of the sessions on our honeypots have a small number of requests, however there are
a few session with many requests. Or, most of the sessions are short in duration, but there
are a few that last for hours.
In this section, we summarize the methods used to statistically characterize malicious
Web session features. A random variable X [44] with cumulative distribution function F (x)
is said to be heavy-tailed if
1 − F (x) = x−α L(x)

(4.1)

where L(x) is slowly varying as x → ∞.
The simplest heavy-tailed distribution is a Pareto distribution with a continuous shape
parameter α > 0 and a continuous location (scale) parameter b > 0. The cumulative
distribution function (CDF) for Pareto distribution is:
b
F (x) = P [X ≤ x] = 1 − ( )α , b 6 x < +∞
x

(4.2)

If 1 < α ≤ 2, the distribution has a ﬁnite mean and inﬁnite variance; if α ≤ 1, the
distribution has inﬁnite mean and variance. Thus, if α is less then 2 the distribution has
inﬁnite variance meaning that the tails of the distribution go to zero slowly. In practical
terms, a random variable that follows a heavy-tailed distribution can give rise to extremely
large values with non-negligible probability.
To estimate the tail index α of a Pareto distribution we use the log-log complementary
distribution (LLCD) plots and Hills estimator as in [19], [18], [16]. LLCD plot is a plot of
the complementary cumulative distribution function P [X > x] = 1 − F (x) on a log-log axes.
Linear behavior for the upper tail is evidence of a heavy-tailed distribution. If this is the
case, we select a value for x from the LLCD plot above which the plot seems to be linear.
Then we estimate the slope, which is equal to −α, using least-square regression.
Another alternative approach to estimate the tail index α is the Hill estimator [44]. It
estimates α as a function of the k largest elements in the data set. Let X1 , X2 , . . . , Xn denote
observed values of the random variable X and let X(1) ≥ X(2) ≥ . . . ≥ X(n) be the ordered
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statistics of the data set. We pick k < n and compute the Hill estimator
1∑
=
log X(i) − log X(k+1) .
k i=1
k

Hk,n

For each value of k we estimate the tail index parameter as αk,n =

(4.3)
1
.
Hk,n

These estimates

are then plotted as a function of k, and if the estimator stabilizes to a constant value this
provides an estimate of α.
The absence of such straight line behavior is an indication that the data are not consistent
with Pareto-like distribution. In those cases, we ﬁtted alternative distributions. In particular,
we ﬁtted the lognormal distribution which is a skewed distribution with two parameters: µ
and σ. The lognormal distribution, unlike the Pareto distribution, has a ﬁnite variance. The
cumulative distribution function (CDF) for two parameter Lognormal distribution is:

F (x) = Φ(

lnx − µ
), 0 < x < +∞
σ

(4.4)

where Φ is the Laplace Integral.

4.1.1

Andreson-Darling goodness-of-ﬁt test

The Anderson-Darling [2] is a goodness-of-ﬁt test used to test if a sample of data came
from a population with a speciﬁed continuous cumulative distribution function F (x). This
test is more powerful than the better known Kolmogorov-Smirnov and χ2 tests, particularly
for detecting deviations in the tail of a distribution. Thus, the Anderson-Darling test gives
more weight to the tails than the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
The Anderson-Darling statistic A2 is deﬁned as
1∑
(2i − 1)[lnF (Xi ) + ln(1 − F (Xn−i+1 ))]
A = −n −
n i=1
n

2

(4.5)

The null hypothesis is rejected at the chosen signiﬁcance level α if the test statistic, A2 ,
is greater than the critical value obtained from a table. For the Pareto test, we use the
asymptotic signiﬁcance points from Table 4.1 that are given in [2].
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Signiﬁcance Level α
0.1
0.05
0.01
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Critical Value (Signiﬁcance Point)
1.933
2.492
3.857

Table 4.1: Signiﬁcance levels and the critical values

4.2

Analyzing the features of malicious Web sessions

In this section, we present statistical analysis of the following features: Number of Requests per Session, Bytes Transferred per Session and Session Duration for all data sets.
We ﬁrst suspect that the best model for the features is a heavy-tailed distribution, that is,
a Pareto distribution. For each data set, we observe a 3D scatter plot in which a point
within the cube is a Web session characterized by Session Duration, Number of Requests,
and Bytes Transferred. Figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4, illustrate the Web sessions in 3D space
from WebDBAdmin I, Web 2.0 I, WebDBAdmin II, and Web 2.0 II data set, respectively.
We see that most of the points (sessions) are close to the origin where the values of all the
three features are small; however, there are points such that at least one of the session’s
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4.2.1

Number of Requests per Web Session

The histogram of the Number of Requests per Web Session for the Web 2.0 I data set is
shown in Figure 4.5. It can be noticed that most of the Web sessions observed on the Web
2.0 honeypot have a small number of requests, but there are a few of them that have many
requests. The minimum, median and maximum for Number of Requests per Web Session
for Web 2.0 I feature are: 1/2/1021. Thus, most of the sessions have 1,2,4, or 5 requests,
however there were 3 sessions with 1021 requests each. These sessions were DoS attacks
which did not have long duration (in time). Besides the DoS sessions, among the sessions
in the tail of the Number of Requests were vulnerability scans in which attackers accessed
Static content. Some of these sessions had 491 requests, but zero bytes transferred since
attackers were looking for applications such as phpMyAdmin that were not deployed on our
honeypots [18].
The LLCD plot of the Number of Requests per Session for the Web 2.0 I data set is
shown in Figure 4.6. The estimate of αLLCD is 0.73, with a high value of the coeﬃcient of
determination R2 = 0.9, which indicates a good ﬁt between the empirical and mathematical
distribution.
Since the αHills is as a function of the k largest elements in the data set, we take the 100
sessions with largest Number of Request to represent the tail of the whole data set. From
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the Hill plot of the Number of Requests per Session for the Web 2.0 I data set is shown
in Figure 4.7, we observe that α is approximately 0.8 which is consistent with the estimate
from the LLCD plot.
Thus, we ﬁt the Pareto distribution in the tail. The Pareto parameters for this tail are: α
= 0.8 and b=6. We use the Anderson-Darling goodness-of-ﬁt test to test the null hypothesis
that the tail indeed follows a Pareto Distribution. We estimated the A2 statistics as described
in the previous section and we got 1.655712. We take the signiﬁcance level to be 0.05, thus
from the Table 4.1, the corresponding critical value is 2.495. Since 1.655712 < 2.495, we
do not reject the null hypothesis that the Number of Request per Session follows a Pareto
distribution.
Table 4.2 summarizes the models that we ﬁtted to the tail of the Number of Requests
per Web session for all data sets.
WebDBAdmin I
1/1/49
Lognormal
σ = 0.583
µ = 2.495
2.36

min/median/max
Distribution
Parameters
A2

Web 2.0 I
1/2/1021
Pareto
α = 0.8
b=6
1.655712

WebDBAdmin II
1/2/50
Lognormal
σ = 0.512
µ = 2.556
1.447

Web 2.0 II
1/2/285
Pareto
α = 1.6
b = 29
0.4695654
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Table 4.2: Distribution ﬁtting to the tail of Number of Requests per Session for all data sets
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The maximum number of requests per session in the Web 2.0 I and Web 2.0 II data sets
were 1021 and 285, respectively, whereas in the WebDBAdmin I and WebDBAdmin II there
were 49 and 50 requests, respectively. This means that the longest Web sessions in Web
2.0 honeypot had a much higher number of requests compared to the Number of Requests
observed on a phpMyAdmin honeypots.
So, what did the attackers do in sessions with maximum number of requests in each data
set? The session with 1021 Number of Requests from the Web 2.0 I data set was due to
Denial of Service attack on Microsoft IIS, and the session with 285 Number of Requests from
the Web 2.0 II data set was labeled as Spam on Wiki. The 50 requests within a session in
the WebDBAdmin II data set were due to password cracking on phpMyAdmin, whereas the
session with 49 requests in the WebDBAdmin I data set was labeled as e-mail harvesting.
As it can be seen from Table 4.2, the tails of Number of Requests per Session for both
the Web 2.0 I and Web 2.0 II data set follow Pareto distribution with α < 1 and α < 2,
respectively. The hypotheses that the tail of Number of Requests per session follows a Pareto
distribution for the WebDBAdmin I and WebDBAdmin II data sets ware rejected. Instead, a
lognormal distribution with parameters given in Table 4.2 was ﬁtted into the tails of Number
of Requests per session for both WebDBAdmin I and WebDBAdmin II data sets.
It follows that only the tails of Number of Requests per Session for both Web 2.0 I and
Web 2.0 II exhibit a heavy-tail behavior.

4.2.2

Bytes Transferred per Web Session

The histogram of Bytes Transferred per Web Session for the Web 2.0 I data set is shown
in Figure 4.8. The minimum, median and maximum for this feature are: 0 B /9445 B
/37,319,140 B. This indicates a heavy-tailed behavior, since most of the sessions have a small
number of bytes transferred and a few had a large number of bytes transferred. The three
sessions with most bytes (i.e., 17 MB, 23 MB and 35 MB) were vulnerability scans labeled
as Static. Thus, attackers accessing Static content such as videos and pictures contributed
towards the large number of bytes transferred within a session. Among the sessions with
a large number of bytes transferred were sessions in which attackers did password cracking
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attacks on Blog user accounts, DoS sessions, and some vulnerability scans from the “Static
& Blog & Wiki” category.
The LLCD plot of Bytes Transferred per Session for data set Web 2.0 I is shown in Figure
4.9. The estimate of αLLCD is 0.56, with a high value of the coeﬃcient of determination R2
= 0.95.
The tail has 100 sessions that have the largest bytes transferred. From the Hill plot of
the Bytes Transferred per Session for data set Web 2.0 I shown in Figure 4.10, we observe
that α is approximately 0.56 which is approximately consistent with the estimate from the
LLCD plot.
In the tail, we ﬁtted a Pareto distribution with parameteres α = 0.6 and b=36,035. The
A2 statistics was 0.8668536. We take the signiﬁcance level to be 0.05, thus from the Table
4.1 the corresponding critical value is 2.495. Since 0.8668536 < 2.495, we do not reject the
null hypothesis that the Bytes Transferred per Session follows a Pareto distribution.
Table 4.3 summarizes the models that we ﬁtted to the tails of the Bytes Transferred per
Web session for all data sets.

Distribution
Parameters

A2

WebDBAdmin I
304B/14KB/3MB
Lognormal (3P)
σ = 3.625
µ = 8.748
γ = 41751.0
1.3306

Web 2.0 I
0B/9KB/35MB
Pareto
α = 0.6
b = 36035

WebDBAdmin II
0B/2.3KB/55MB
Pareto
α = 0.5
b = 18747

Web 2.0 II
0B/20KB/55MB
Pareto
α = 1.2
b = 162272

0.8668536

0.7167136

1.313801

Table 4.3: Distribution ﬁtting to the tail of Bytes Transferred per Session for all data sets

The Web 2.0 I, Web 2.0 II and WebDBAdmin II data sets had a few sessions with
many bytes transferred. For example, the maximum bytes transferred within a Web sessions
for the Web 2.0 I, Web 2.0 II and WebDBAdmin II data sets was 35 MB, 55 MB and 55
MB, respectively. However, the maximum number of bytes transferred per session in the
WebDBAdmin I data set was only 3MB which is much less compared to the other data sets.
This is why we reject the hypothesis that Bytes Transferred per Web Session follows a Pareto
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Web 2.0 I data set
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Web 2.0 I data set
distribution for the WebDBAdmin I data set, whereas for all the other data sets, we do not
reject that hypothesis. We assume that the reason for smaller number of bytes transferred
is the fact that the WebDBAdmin I data set was collected from a conﬁguration with less
static content such as ﬁgures, videos and so on.
Thus, Bytes Transferred per Web Session for the Web 2.0 I, Web 2.0 II and WebDBAdmin
II data sets are modeled with Pareto distribution, whereas for data set WebDBAdmin I we
ﬁtted Lognormal distribution with parameters shown in Table 4.3.
It is interesting to see what the attacker activities were in the sessions that ended up
with maximum bytes transferred for each data set. The session with 55 MB transferred in
Web 2.0 II was labeled as Blog and Wiki, whereas the 35 MB transferred per session in Web
2.0 I was due to viewing Static content. The session with 55 MB transferred in data set
WebDBAdmin II was labeled as Static and PhpMyAdmin, whereas the session with 3 MB
transferred in data set WebDBAdmin I was due to e-mail harvesting activity.

4.2.3

Duration of a Web Session

The histogram of the Session Duration for the Web 2.0 I data set is shown in Figure
4.11. The minimum, median and maximum for this feature are: 0 /2 /4330 seconds. By
looking at the histogram, we observe again that most of the sessions are short and only a
few of them are long in duration. The longest session lasted 72 minutes and belonged to a
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vulnerability scan in the category “Static & Wiki”. The second longest session, which lasted
58 minutes, was classiﬁed as “Spam on the Wiki”. Among the long sessions for the data set
Web 2.0 I there were also vulnerability scans from the “Blog & Wiki” and “Static & Blog &
Wiki” categories.
The LLCD plot of the Session Duration for data set Web 2.0 I is shown in Figure 4.12.
The estimate of αLLCD is 0.56, and the coeﬃcient of determination R2 = 0.86.
From the Hill plot of the Session Duration for data set Web 2.0 I shown in Figure 4.13,
we observe that α is approximately 0.6 which is consistent with the estimate from the LLCD
plot.
The Pareto parameters for this tail are: α = 0.6 and b=14. Now, using the AndersonDarling goodness-of-ﬁt test, we test the null hypothesis that the tail follows a Pareto Distribution. The A2 statistics is 2.61853. We take the signiﬁcance level to be 0.01, since
the corresponding critical value is 3.857. Since 2.61853 < 3.857, we do not reject the null
hypothesis that the Session Duration follows a Pareto distribution.
Table 4.4 summarizes the models that we ﬁtted to the tails of Web session Duration for
all data sets. As it can be observed from the Table 4.4, the tails of session duration for all
data sets was modeled with Pareto distribution. This means that for each data set there are a
few sessions that are very long compared to most of the sessions that were short in duration.
The maximum Session Duration in the WebDBAdmin I, Web 2.0 I, WebDBAdmin II and
Web 2.0 II data sets were 3.2 minutes, 1.2 hours, 1.9 hours and 14.8 hours, respectively. The
attacker activities in these long sessions were labeled as CVE attack, Static and Wiki, Static
and Spam on Wiki, respectively.

min/median/max
Distribution
Parameters
A2

WebDBAdmin I
0/0/194 sec
Pareto
α = 0.7
b=5
1.6921

Web 2.0 I
0/2/4330 sec
Pareto
α = 0.6
b = 14
2.61853

WebDBAdmin II
0/0/6985 sec
Pareto
α = 0.5
b = 40
2.490836

Web 2.0 II
0/4/53383 sec
Pareto
α = 1.1
b = 1376
2.249344

Table 4.4: Distribution ﬁtting to the tail of Session Duration for all data sets
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4.2.4

Summary of the distribution ﬁtting to the tail of the session
features

All three features (Number of Requests, Bytes Transferred, Duration) for sessions in the
Web 2.0 I and Web 2.0 II data sets follow a heavy-tailed distribution. In particular, we ﬁtted
a Pareto distribution in the tails of each feature and showed that the hypothesis that the
“tails” of the features follow a Pareto distribution cannot be rejected for sessions in the Web
2.0 I and Web 2.0 II data sets.
The duration feature for the sessions in WebDBAdmin I data set follows a heavy-tailed
distribution. That is, we ﬁtted a Pareto distribution in the tail of duration feature. Pareto
distribution is not a good ﬁt to the tail of the Number of Requests and Bytes Transferred
features for WebDBAdmin I data set. Instead, the Lognormal distribution is a good ﬁt.
Bytes Transferred and Duration features for sessions in WebDBAdmin II data set follow a heavy-tailed distribution. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁtted a Pareto distribution in the tails of
Bytes Transferred and Duration features and showed the hypothesis that the “tails” of these
features follow a Pareto distribution cannot be rejected for sessions in Web 2.0 II data set.
Pareto distribution is not a good ﬁt to the tail of Number of Requests feature for WebDBAdmin II data set. Instead, the Lognormal distribution is a good ﬁt.
In general, what we observed is that most of the malicious sessions are short, with small
requests and small bytes transferred. This can be observed in Figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4,
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which show many sessions close to the origin. However, there are sessions that have at least
one of these three features with large values. These large values make the tails of the features.
This means that sessions can have feature(s) with signiﬁcantly large values and these kinds
of sessions happen with non-negligible probability. For example, most of the sessions are
short in duration which can be considered as typical, however we also observed sessions that
lasted for hours.

4.3

Correlation between Web session features

In this section, we explore the correlation coeﬃcients between the pairs of session features
in all data sets. We use the Spearman’s rank correlation coeﬃcient rs since session features,
as shown in the section 4.2, are not normally distributed. In addition, Spearman’s correlation
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coeﬃcient is rather robust to tails, which may consist of up to 20% of the data sample.
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Figures 4.14, 4.15, and 4.16 are 2D projections (i.e., 2D scatter plots for pairs of features)
of Web 2.0 I sessions shown in the 3D scatter plot 4.2. The results for Web 2.0 I showed that
the Number of Request and Session Duration features are positively correlated with rs = 0.76.
The Number of Request and Bytes Transferred features are also positively correlated with
rs = 0.70, as well as Bytes Transferred and Session duration with rs = 0.72. All correlations
are statistically signiﬁcant at 0.05 signiﬁcance level.
These pairs of features are positively correlated since many sessions have small number
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of request, bytes transferred, and are short (Figure 4.2). However, we also observe some long
sessions, which have very few requests and bytes transferred, or sessions with many bytes
transferred which are short and do not have many requests. These sessions are a few and
therefore do not aﬀect the Spearman correlation coeﬃcients.
Table 4.5 summarizes the correlation coeﬃcients between the pairs of session features
for all data sets. It can be concluded that the pairs of the session features are positively
correlated for all data sets. In particular, the correlation values range from moderate, such
as 0.41 to high, such as 0.90. For each data set, the pair of features Duration and Number
or requests per session has the highest correlation compared to the other pairs.

Bytes & Requests
Duration & Bytes
Duration & Requests

WebDBAdmin I
0.81
0.79
0.90

Web 2.0 I
0.70
0.72
0.76

WebDBAdmin II
0.66
0.57
0.80

Web 2.0 II
0.44
0.41
0.82

Table 4.5: Spearman correlation coeﬃcient between Web session features for all data sets

4.4

Number of Requests and sessions per unique source
IP

Next, we analyze whether Web sessions and requests per unique source IP follow a heavytailed behavior. For data set Web 2.0 I, the hypothesis that the number of sessions per
unique attacker follows Pareto distribution was rejected. Instead, a lognormal distribution
with parameters given in Table 4.6 was a good ﬁt for the number of sessions per unique IP.
For the the Web 2.0 I data set, the Number of Requests per unique source IP (or attacker)
follows Pareto distribution with parameters α = 1.3 and b=26. Practically, this means that
the large number of requests can originate from a small number of attackers with nonnegligible probability. These events are rare but they generate the majority of the requests
to the honeypot. For example, in the Web 2.0 I data set, 38% of the requests were from one
IP address that launched a DoS attack on the Microsoft IIS Server.
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Table 4.6 summarizes the distributions of the sessions and requests per unique IP for all
data sets.

min/median/max
Distribution
Parameters

A2

WebDBAdmin I
Sessions
Requests
1/1/24
1/2/98
Lognormal Lognormal(3P)
σ = 0.675 σ = 1.15
µ = 0.694 µ = 1.63
γ = 5.77
2.25
0.606

Web2.0 I
Sessions
Requests
1/1/58
1/3/3724
Lognormal
Pareto
σ = 0.70538 α = 1.3
µ = 2.0034 b=26

WebDBAdmin II
Sessions
Requests
1/1/64
1/2/151
Lognormal Lognormal
σ = 0.718 σ = 0.594
µ = 1.7372 µ = 2.864

Web2.0 II
Sessions Requests
1/1/312 1/2/2541
Pareto
Pareto
α = 0.8 α = 1.2
b=7
b=22

1.5498

1.713

0.9

0.712

1.23

2.33

Table 4.6: Requests and sessions from unique source IP

4.5

Statistical comparison of Web session features across
all data sets

In this section we explore whether there is any diﬀerence in the features of the malicious
Web sessions observed in the four data sets: WebDBAdmin I, Web 2.0 I, WebDBAdmin II
and Web 2.0 II. Furthermore, we want to investigate whether the diﬀerences of Web session
features observed on diﬀerent Web-based systems (WebDBAdmin II and Web 2.0 II) and
collected during the same period of time are statistically signiﬁcant, that is, are non random.
Finally, we want to examine whether there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the features of Web
sessions observed on the same Web-based systems (Web 2.0 I and Web 2.0 II) collected
during diﬀerent periods of time.
First, to compare the Web session features across all data sets, we use Kruskal-Wallis [26],
a nonparametric one-way ANOVA, which compares medians across three or more groups of
observations. As indicated in [26], the test assumes that observations are independent, that
all those within a given sample come from a single population, and that the C populations
are of approximately the same form. To do this test, we use a function that is implemented
in R, which is also explained in [34]. This function gives the p-value and if the p-value is
less then or equal to α, we reject the null hypothesis; whereas if the p-value is bigger than
α, we do not reject the null hypothesis. The signiﬁcance level that we use is 0.05.
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Therefore, we use the Kurskal-Wallis to test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis #1:
H01 : There is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the median value for Number of Requests
per Session across all data sets.
HA1 : At least one of the medians is diﬀerent.
Hypothesis #2:
H02 : There is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the median value for Bytes Transferred
per Session across all data sets.
HA2 : At least one of the medians is diﬀerent.
Hypothesis #3:
H03 : There is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the median value for Session Duration
across all data sets.
HA3 : At least one of the medians is diﬀerent.
Figure 4.17 shows the box plots of Web session features for all data sets. We see that
the features have a few large values that make the tail to the right, and hence we cannot
observe the median values. This is why we “zoom-in” this ﬁgure as in Figure 4.18 to see the
diﬀerences across the medians.
From Figure 4.18 we observe that the median values for Number of Requests per Session
are 1, 2, 2, 2, for WebDBAdmin I, Web 2.0 I, WebDBAdmin II, and Web 2.0 II, respectively.
We visually see that not all median values are the same. This is conﬁrmed by the test
since the p-value obtained from the test is p < 2.2e − 16, (which is almost zero) based on
a chi-square distribution with 3 degrees of freedom. Since the p-value is less then 0.05 we
conclude that we can reject the null hypothesis H01 that the there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence
between the median value for Number of Requests per Session across all data sets.
From Figure 4.18 we observe the median values for Bytes Transferred feature are 4 KB,
9 KB, 2.3 KB, 20 KB for WebDBAdmin I, Web 2.0 I, WebDBAdmin II, and Web 2.0 II,
respectively. The test yields a p-value< 2.2e−16 which is less then 0.05. This means that we
can reject the null hypothesis H02 that there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the median
value for Bytes Transferred per Session across all data sets.
From Figure 4.18 we observe that the median values for Session Duration are 0, 2, 0, 4
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for WebDBAdmin I, Web 2.0 I, WebDBAdmin II, and Web 2.0 II, respectively. The test
yields a p-value< 2.2e − 16 based on the chi-square distribution with 3 degrees of freedom.
Since the p-value is less then 0.05, we can reject the null hypothesis H03 that there is no
signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the median value for Session Duration across all data sets.
We can conclude that the diﬀerences between median Number of Requests per session
across all data sets are non-random and are statistically signiﬁcant. Also, the diﬀerences in
median session duration across all data sets are statistically signiﬁcant and are not due to
random chance. Finally, the diﬀerences between median Bytes Transferred per session across
all data sets are statistically signiﬁcant and are non-random. Thus, we conclude that we
have observed diﬀerent attacker behavior across all four data sets, and these variations are
statistically signiﬁcant. This behavior may be expected by the fact that there are diﬀerences
in honeypot conﬁgurations, as well as period of data collection.
Next, we examine whether there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the features of Web sessions
observed on same Web-based systems (Web 2.0 I and Web 2.0 II) collected during diﬀerent
periods of time. When testing the diﬀerences among two groups, we use the Mann-Whitney
Test [47].
Hypothesis #4:
H04 : There is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the median value for Number of Requests
per Session between Web 2.0 I and Web 2.0 II data sets.
HA4 : There is a diﬀerence in the medians between these two data sets.
Hypothesis #5:
H05 : There is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the median value for Bytes Transferred
per Session Web 2.0 I and Web 2.0 II data sets.
HA5 : There is a diﬀerence in the medians between these two data sets.
Hypothesis #6:
H06 : There is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the median value for Session Duration
between Web 2.0 I and Web 2.0 II data sets.
HA6 : There is a diﬀerence in the medians between these two data sets.
For the hypotheses numbered 4, 5, and 6, the p-value was less then 0.05. Therefore, we
can reject the null hypotheses H04 , H05 , and H06 . This means that on the same Web-based
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system (Web 2.0 applications) during a diﬀerent period of time, the attacker behaviors were
diﬀerent and non random.
Finally, we examine whether there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the features of Web sessions
observed on diﬀerent Web-based systems (WebDBAdmin II and Web 2.0 II) collected during
the same period of time.
Hypothesis #7:
H07 : There is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the median value for Number of Requests
per Session between WebDBAdmin II and Web 2.0 II data sets.
HA7 : There is a diﬀerence in the medians between these two data sets.
Hypothesis #8:
H08 : There is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the median value for Bytes Transferred
per Session WebDBAdmin II and Web 2.0 II data sets.
HA8 : There is a diﬀerence in the medians between these two data sets.
Hypothesis #9:
H09 : There is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the median value for Session Duration
between WebDBAdmin II and Web 2.0 II data sets.
HA9 : There is a diﬀerence in the medians between these two data sets.
For the hypothesis numbered 7, 8, and 9, the p-value was less then 0.05. Therefore, we
can reject the null hypotheses H07 , H08 , and H08 . This means that on a diﬀerent honeypot
conﬁgurations (WebDBAdmin II and Web 2.0 II) running on the same period of time, we
have diﬀerent attackers behavior. These diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant and non
random.

4.5.1

Description of feature characteristics for diﬀerent types of
vulnerability scans and attacks

Motivated by the fact that there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the features of Web
sessions across all data sets, we further explore the three features that characterize diﬀerent
types of vulnerability scan sessions and attack sessions. For example, we explore whether
the features of DoS attack sessions are diﬀerent from the features of the other types of attack
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Figure 4.17: Box plots of Web session features
sessions.
Figure 4.19 shows the box plot of Web 2.0 sessions (the left side are sessions from the
Web 2.0 I data set, the right side are sessions from the Web 2.0 II data set). As it can
be seen from the left side of the Figure 4.19, relatively short sessions with large number of
requests are due to DoS attacks, while the sessions with most number of bytes transferred
are from the “Static (S)” category. For data set Web 2.0 II, long sessions with many number
of requests are due to posting Spam on Wiki, while the sessions with the most number of
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bytes transferred are from the “Blog and Wiki (B&W)” category. It should be noted that
for both Web 2.0 I and II data sets, there were no sessions with all three features having
signiﬁcantly large values.
Figure 4.20 shows the box plot for WebDBAdmin sessions (the left side are sessions from
WebDBAdmin I data set, the right side are sessions from WebDbAdmin II data set). As it
can be seen from left side of Figure 4.19, sessions with most number of bytes transferred and
the most number of requests are due to attacks labeled as “e-mail harvesting”. Sessions with
the longest duration with many request but with small bytes transferred are due to are due
to password cracking on PhpMyAdmin user accounts. For WebDBAdmin II data set, the
sessions with the most number of bytes transferred are from the “Static and PhpMyAdmin”
category. It should be noted that for both WebDBAdmin I and II data sets, there were no
sessions with all three features having signiﬁcantly large values.
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Figure 4.19: Box plots of Web session features: Left side Web 2.0 I, Right side Web 2.0 II
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Chapter 5
Cluster Analysis of malicious Web
Sessions
In this chapter, we present a cluster analysis for malicious Web sessions collected from
our advertised honeypots. The purpose of a cluster analysis is to look for similarity groups
called clusters in a data set. Objects belonging in the same cluster are similar to each other,
whereas objects belonging to diﬀerent cluster are dissimilar.
Our analysis distinguishes between attacks and vulnerability scans on the Web-based
systems. We are interested in seeing if attacks and vulnerability scans that ended up on
the Web Server would be separated into diﬀerent clusters. Furthermore, we are interested
to see what characteristics of attacks and vulnerability scans on a particular Web System
contribute to better separation between them.

5.1

Feature Normalization

In this section, we explain the feature normalization process. In our analysis, the ranges
of the features diﬀer signiﬁcantly. Some features take continuous values whereas other take
binary values such as zero or one. We apply Min Max Normalization, since we want each
feature to lie within the new range [0, 1] and the underlying distribution of the feature within
the new range of values to remain the same [41]. We use the function “mmnorm” from the
“dprep” R-package.
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As it can be seen from formula (5.1), each value of a feature is subtracted by the minimum
value of that feature, and then this value is divided by the diﬀerence of the range of that
feature. These new values are multiplied by the new range of the feature and ﬁnally added
to the new minimum value of the feature. Thus, these operations transform the feature value
xi to lie within the new range (mintarget , maxtarget ) which is typically [0, 1].
x′i = [

5.2

xi − minvalue
](maxtarget − mintarget ) + mintarget
maxvalue − minvalue

(5.1)

Feature Selection

Feature Selection (FS) [29] can be described as the search for a subset of original features.
The motivation of using feature selection is that it reduces the number of features, removes
the irrelevant and noisy features, speeds up the algorithm and hopefully improves the performance of the algorithm. The best feature subset is measured by some evaluation criterion.
Depending on what evaluation criterion is used, feature selection algorithms are divided into
three categories [29]: the filter model, the wrapper model, and the hybrid model. The ﬁlter
model uses general characteristics of the data to evaluate the feature subset and does not
use any learner (algorithm). The wrapper model uses some learner (mining algorithm) and
its performance is used as the evaluation criterion. The hybrid model is a mixture of the
ﬁlter and the wrapper model.
The several approaches that we use for feature selection are described as follows.
• One method is to rank the features from the most informative to the least informative;
that is, to measure the information gain for each feature [20]. Then, we pick the top
three features that have the highest information gain. This selection method belongs
to the ﬁlter method since it uses characteristics of the data to evaluate the features and
does not use any learning algorithm. Formally, for each feature Ai , the information
gain is calculated by the formula (5.2):

IGi = H(C) − H(C|Ai )

(5.2)
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p(c)log2 p(c)
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(5.3)

c∈C

H(C|A) = −

∑
a∈A

p(a)

∑

p(c|a)log2 p(c|a)

(5.4)

c∈C

where formula (5.3) and (5.4) give the entropy of the class feature C before and after
observing the feature A.
• Next, we use the feature selection method called Sequential Forward Selection (SFS).
This method starts with an empty set, and in the ﬁrst step adds the feature that
performs the best. Then in a subsequent step adds another feature that together with
the previously added feature(s) gives the best performance, and so forth. In [38], the
classiﬁer used for this algorithm is Support Vector Machine. This method is a wrapper
since it uses Support Vector Machine classiﬁer to evaluate the subset of features.
• We also use SFS with another classiﬁer called J48. The output of the SFS algorithm
is a subset of features. This method is a wrapper since it uses J48 classiﬁer to evaluate
the subset of features.
• We also select features from the nodes of decision trees generated for each data set in
[38].
• Finally, we use feature selection based on the Sparse K-means clustering suggested in
[48]. This is a new algorithm used for feature selection for clustering.
The selected features are then used in the cluster analysis of the sessions. We compare
the performance of the K-means clustering when all session features are used and when only
a subset of selected features are used. We also explore what feature selection approach will
give the best results for each data set.
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K-means algorithm

In this section we describe the K-means algorithm which is used in our cluster analysis.
As it is stated in [12], we use K-means algorithm because it is one of the quickest and
simplest algorithm that solves the clustering problem. Let X = {x1 , ..., xn } be a data set
consisting of n Web sessions. Each Web session is a data point in d-dimensional Euclidian
space, xi = (f1 , ..., fd ), where f1 , ..., fd are the d feature values of the i-th Web session. The
goal is to split the Web sessions into K clusters so that the distance of the n data points
from their respective cluster centroids is minimized [23]. Each cluster has a center µk which
is known as centroid and it can be considered as a representative of the group.
Thus, the input of the K-means algorithm is the nxd data matrix, the number of clusters
K, and the initial value of the centroids. The algorithm has the following steps [23]:
1. Initialize K points that will represent the initial group centroids.
2. For each data point estimate the Euclidian distance between that point and each
centroid using equation (5.5). Assign that point (session) to the cluster that has the
closest centroid.
3. After all points (sessions) have been assigned, recalculate the positions of the K centroids, that is, µk is now the average of all points assigned to that cluster.
4. Repeat step 2 and step 3 until the centroids no longer move (they converge)
n
∑
1
dist(x, y) = ( (xi − zi )2 ) 2

(5.5)

i=1

5.4

Selecting the number of clusters

K-means algorithm assumes the number of clusters K to be known a priori. In this section,
we explain how we select the number of clusters before we apply the K-means algorithm. To
do so, we use the methods proposed in [43]. First, we use the intra-cluster distance measure
which is deﬁned as the distance between a point and its cluster centroid and we take the
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average of all of these distances, i.e.
K
1 ∑∑
intra =
∥x − zi ∥2
N i=1 xεC

(5.6)

i

where N is the number of sessions (points), K is the number of clusters, and zi is the cluster
centroid of cluster Ci . We also measure the inter-cluster distance, which represents the
distance between clusters, and we want this measure to be as big as possible. The formula
for inter cluster distance is:

inter = min(∥zi − zj ∥2 ), i=1,2,...,K-1; j=i+1,...,K

(5.7)

The minimum value for the validity measure given with equation (5.8) should help us
choose the number of clusters K for the K-means algorithm.

validity =

intra
inter

(5.8)

We minimize the intra-cluster distance and since this measure is in the numerator, we
minimize the validity measure. We maximize the inter-cluster distance measure, and since
this is in the denominator, we again want to minimize the validity measure.

5.5

Assessing performance of K-means

In this section we explain how we evaluate the performance of the K-means algorithm.
The output of this algorithm is K clusters of Web sessions. Since we have previous knowledge
(label) of each session, we investigate the type of sessions that ended up in each cluster, that
is, we count how many attacks or vulnerability scans are in each cluster. The purpose is to
assign a label for each cluster. Each cluster is labeled as either attack or vulnerability scan,
based on the majority of the sessions in it. That is, if attack sessions are the majority in the
cluster, that cluster is labeled as an attack cluster, whereas if vulnerability scan sessions are
the majority, we assign a vulnerability scan label to that cluster.
After we have labeled each cluster, we construct the following confusion matrix:

Ana Dimitrijevikj

Chapter 5. Cluster Analysis of malicious Web Sessions

predict
Vulnerability Scan
predict
Attack

51

actual
actual
Vulnerability Scan Attack
A
B
C

D

Table 5.1: Confusion Matrix
In our analysis, the values A, B, C, D from Table 5.1 denote true negatives, false negatives,
false positives and true positives, respectively. The measures that we compute to assess the
performance of the K-means algorithm are:
probability of detection (pd) = recall =

probability of false alarms (pf) =

precision (prec) =
√
balance = 1 −

D
B+D

C
A+C

D
D+C

(0 − pf )2 + (1 − pd)2
√
2

overall accuracy =

A+D
A+B+C +D

(5.9)

(5.10)

(5.11)

(5.12)

(5.13)

In order to measure the qualities of clustering results of the K-means algorithm for each
data set we use the measures deﬁned as follows. The overall accuracy, deﬁned by equation
(5.13), is the percentage of true negatives and true positives, or in other words what the
learner has detected correctly. It should be noted that using only overall accuracy measure
can be misleading especially when the data set has uneven class distributions [33]. For
the purposes of completeness, we compute the overall accuracy measure even though in
our analyzes some data sets have a signiﬁcantly smaller number of attacks compared to
vulnerability scans. Probability of detection, which sometimes is referred to as recall, is
deﬁned by equation (5.9). Note that in our analysis the probability of detection is the
probability of detecting an attack, which is the ratio of detected attacks (true positives) to
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all attacks. Probability of false alarms, deﬁned by equation (5.10), is the the ratio of detected
attacks when no attack was present to all vulnerability scans. Precision, deﬁned by equation
(5.11), is the ratio of true positives to the to the number of true and false positives. The
precision determines how many of the identiﬁed attacks were correct. Balance, deﬁned by
equation (5.12), denotes balance between the probability of detection and the probability
of false alarm. Ideally, we want the probability of detection to be 1 and the probability of
false alarm to be 0, but this is rarely achieved in practice. As it can be observed from the
equation (5.12), the balance measures the Euclidian distance from this ideal spot of pf=0,
pd=1 to a pair of (pf,pd). Then, the balance is normalized by the diagonal in the ROC
√
square 2 and subtracted from 1. It follows that the higher balances are closer to the ideal
spot of pf=0, pd=1 [33].

5.6

Results of Cluster Analysis

In this section, we ﬁrst present the clustering results for each data set, then we give the
summary tables and compare the results across all data sets. Finally, we give the conclusions
drawn from our results.

5.6.1

Clustering results for the WebDBAdmin I data set

In this subsection, we present clustering results of malicious Web sessions from the WebDBAdmin I data set. Figure 5.1 shows the validity measure for a diﬀerent number of clusters
with sessions characterized by all features. As it can be seen from Figure 5.1, the minimum
value for the validity measure is when the number of clusters is three, therefore we select
K to be three. The minimum value of the validity measure corresponds to the number of
clusters that have minimum inter-cluster distance and maximum intra-cluster distance.
As previously discussed, the role of the K-means is to split the malicious sessions into
K clusters. Table 5.2 shows the distribution of vulnerability scan and attack sessions in
the resulting clusters. Moreover, it shows and compares the clusters created when sessions
are characterized by all features and when sessions are characterized only by a few features
selected with various techniques. (The number of sessions that are the majority in each
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cluster is highlighted in bold. The type of these sessions denotes the label of the cluster.)
First, we discuss the resulting clusters of Web sessions which are characterized by all 43
features.
As it can be observed from the Figure 5.2 and the ﬁrst row of the Table 5.2, in the case
when all features are used, the majority of sessions in Clusters 2 and 3 are vulnerability
scans, whereas Cluster 1 contains only attack sessions. All ﬁve attack sessions that belong
to Cluster 1 are attacks from the the e-mail harvesting category. Clearly, these ﬁve attacks
are diﬀerent from the other attacks since they are grouped in one cluster. Most of the
vulnerability scans in Cluster 2 belong to categories such as: ﬁngerprinting phpMyAdmin,
dﬁnd, other ﬁngerprints, Static, and so on. Cluster 3 includes the password cracking attacks
on phpMyAdmin user accounts, however these attacks are dominated by vulnerability scans
labeled as Static and phpMyAdmin.
Next, we discuss the clusters of Web sessions which are characterized by three features
(i.e.,GET, Number of requests, and Applications) with highest information gain. These
clusters can be graphically represented and observed from Figure 5.3. The majority of
sessions in Cluster 3 and 4 are attacks, whereas the majority of sessions in Cluster 1 and 2 are
vulnerability scans. In particular, Cluster 3 contains all ﬁve attacks from e-mail harvesting
category (note that these attacks are also separated in one cluster when all features are
used), and Cluster 4 contains 13 sessions (72.22% out of all) labeled as password cracking
phpMyAdmin user accounts. These attacks when characterized by all features are a minority
in a cluster labeled as vulnerability scans.
Next, we discuss the performance of the K-means clustering for data set WebDBAdmin I.
Tables 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 5.7, and 5.8 show the actual and predicted attack and vulnerability
scan sessions for the WebDBAdmin I data set, in the cases when K-means used all the
features of the sessions and in the cases when diﬀerent feature selection methods are used.
As it can be seen from the third column in Table 5.29 and Figure 5.9, the probability of
detection of attack when all features are used to characterize the sessions is 17.00%, and with
feature selection methods, such as three features with the highest InfoGain, features from
the nodes of the pruned decision trees, SFS-SVM and SFS-J48, the probability of detection
improves signiﬁcantly to 72.41%, 79.00%, 65.52%, and 58.62%, respectively. The probability
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Figure 5.1: Validity for WebDBAd- Figure 5.2: Number of Attacks and Vulnerability Scans
min I
for each Cluster for the WebDBAdmin I data set
Data set
Session Type
c1
c2 c3
c4 c5 Total
WebDBAdmin I Vulnerability Scan
0 150 35
185
all features
Attack
5
5 19
29
Total
5 155 54
214
WebDBAdmin I Vulnerability Scan 32 152
0
1
185
feature selection Attack
8
0
5
16
29
max InfoGain
Total
40 152
5
17
214
WebDBAdmin I Vulnerability Scan 35 150
0
0 0
185
feature selection Attack
1
5 13
4 6
29
from dec.trees
Total
36 155 13
4 6
214
WebDBAdmin I Vulnerability Scan 36
40
0 109 0
185
feature selection Attack
1
4 11
5 8
29
SFS-SVM
Total
37
44 11 114 8
214
WebDBAdmin I Vulnerability Scan 39 144
0
0 2
185
feature selection Attack
7
5
9
5 3
29
SFS-J48
Total
46 149
9
5 5
214
WebDBAdmin I Vulnerability Scan
8
60 27
90 0
185
feature selection Attack
5
1 14
4 5
29
sparse k-means Total
13
61 41
94 5
214
Table 5.2: Summary of Clusters of Web Sessions for the WebDBAdmin I data set

of false alarm is very low, from 0% to 1%. The balance measure is the best when features
from pruned trees are selected to characterize the sessions in data set WebDBAdmin I. (In
Figure 5.9, for the WebDBAdmin I data set, the point that is the closest to the ideal point
(0,1).)
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Clearly, this shows that when we remove noisy session features, the K-means algorithm
better separates attacks from vulnerability scan sessions in the WebDBAdmin I data set.
Only the feature selection based on the sparse K-means clustering does not improve the the
probability of detection. The overall accuracy of the K-means is fairly high, which is from
88% to 97%.

0.8

0.2

0.6
0.4

Number of requests

0.6

1.0

0.4

Applications

0.8

1.0

CL 1
CL 2
CL 3
CL 4

0.0

0.2
0.0

0.0
0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

GET

Figure 5.3: 3D scatter plot of clusters of Web sessions from the WebDBAdmin I data set

predict VS
predict Attack

actual VS actual Attack
185
24
0
5

Table 5.3: Confusion Matrix for the WebDBAdmin I data set with all features

predict VS
predict Attack

actual VS actual Attack
185
6
0
23

Table 5.4: Confusion Matrix for the WebDBAdmin I data set with FS from trees

Ana Dimitrijevikj

predict VS
predict Attack

Chapter 5. Cluster Analysis of malicious Web Sessions

actual VS actual Attack
185
10
0
19

Table 5.5: Confusion Matrix for the WebDBAdmin I data set with SFS-SVM feature selection
predict VS
predict Attack

actual VS
185
0

actual Attack
24
5

Table 5.7: Confusion Matrix for the WebDBAdmin I data set with sparse K-means
clustering
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actual VS actual Attack
183
12
2
17

Table 5.6: Confusion Matrix for the WebDBAdmin I data set with SFS-J48 feature
selection
predict VS
predict Attack

actual VS actual Attack
184
8
1
21

Table 5.8: Confusion Matrix for the WebDBAdmin I data set with features with
highest InfoGain

Clustering results for the Web 2.0 I data set

In this subsection, we present the clustering results for data set Web 2.0 I. Figure 5.4
shows the validity measure for a diﬀerent number of clusters of sessions characterized by all
features. We select the number of the clusters to be 10.
After K-means splits the malicious sessions into K clusters, we investigate the types of
sessions in the resulting clusters. Table 5.9 shows the distribution of vulnerability scan and
attack sessions for each cluster. Furthermore, one can compare the clusters created when
sessions are characterized by all features and when sessions are characterized by only a few
features selected with various techniques.
First, we discuss the resulting clusters of Web sessions which are characterized by all 43
features.
As it can be observed from Figure 5.5 and the ﬁrst row of Table 5.9, in the case when all
features are used, the majority of Web sessions in Clusters 1, 6 and 10 are attacks, whereas
the dominating sessions in the other clusters are vulnerability scans. Cluster 1 contains
117 (46.98%) of all the sessions in which attackers posted spam on Wiki. Cluster 6 has 61
(24.49%) of all the Spam on Wiki sessions along with 4 CVE attacks. Cluster 10 contains
only the Denial of Service (DoS) on Microsoft IIS attacks, which means that the DoS attacks
are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the other attacks since they are grouped in a single cluster.
Next, we discuss the clusters of Web sessions characterized by the three features (i.e.,
POST, Maximum length and Minimum length) with highest information gain. Figure 5.6
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Figure 5.4: Validity for the Web 2.0 Figure 5.5: Number of Attacks and Vulnerability Scans
I data set
for each Cluster for the Web 2.0 I data set
illustrates the clusters in 3D space.
The majority of sessions in Cluster 2 and 4 are attacks, whereas the majority of sessions
in Cluster 1 and 3 are vulnerability scans. Speciﬁcally, the most frequent types of attacks
in Cluster 2 are the 169 (67.87%) of all the Spam on Wiki sessions. Similarly, the dominant
type of attacks in Cluster 4 are the 80 Spam on Wiki sessions. The majority of sessions in
Cluster 1 are vulnerability scans such as the 143 sessions that belong to the Wiki category.
Cluster 3 contains most of the vulnerability scan sessions from the Web 2.0 data set. It is
interesting to note that the POST feature has nonzero values for most of the sessions in
Cluster 2 and 4 (in which the majority are attacks), whereas most of the sessions in Cluster
1 and 3 (in which the majority are vulnerability scans) have zero values of the POST feature.
Another interesting observation from the the third row in Table 5.9, in the case when
features are selected from nodes of pruned decision tree, is that Cluster 5 contains 99% of
all the Spam on Wiki sessions. It follows that the spam on Wiki attacks are signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from the other sessions since almost all are grouped in a single cluster. Cluster 4
contains all the DoS attack Web sessions.
Next, we discuss the performance of the K-means algorithm for data set Web 2.0 I. The
confusion matrices given in Tables 5.10, 5.11, 5.12, 5.13, 5.14, and 5.15 show the actual
and predicted attacks and vulnerability scans for the Web 2.0 I data set, in the case when
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Dataset
Web 2.0 I
all features
Web 2.0 I
feature selection
max InfoGain
Web 2.0 I
feature selection
from dec.trees
Web 2.0 I
feature selection
SFS-SVM
Web 2.0 I
feature selection
SFS-J48
Web 2.0 I
feature selection
sparse k-means
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Session Type
Vulnerability Scan
Attack
Total
Vulnerability Scan
Attack
Total
Vulnerability Scan
Attack
Total
Vulnerability Scan
Attack
Total
Vulnerability Scan
Attack
Total
Vulnerability Scan
Attack
Total

c1
0
117
117
178
5
183
601
24
625
2
4
6
783
36
819
260
70
330

c2
11
2
13
4
171
175
1
2
3
1
225
226
41
257
298
111
35
146

c3
202
0
202
642
31
673
172
10
182
821
64
885

58

c4
c5
8 118
0
0
8 118
0
86
86
0
29
4 251
4 280

c6 c7
c8
c9 c10 Total
2 80 255 148
0
824
65
6
66
33
4
293
67 86 321 181
4 1117
824
293
1117
21
824
2
293
23
1117
824
293
1117
824
293
1117
130 204 119
0
824
6
0
0 182
293
136 204 119 182
1117

Table 5.9: Summary of Clusters of Web Sessions for the Web 2.0 I data set

K-means used all session features and in the cases when diﬀerent feature selection algorithms
are used. Using these matrices, we calculate probability of detection, the probability of false
alarm, precision, balance and overall accuracy.

predict VS
predict Attack

actual VS actual Attack
822
107
2
186

predict VS
predict Attack

actual VS actual Attack
794
36
30
257

Table 5.10: Confusion Matrix for the Web
2.0 I data set with all features

Table 5.11: Confusion Matrix for the Web
2.0 I data set with FS from trees

actual VS actual Attack
predict VS
821
64
predict Attack
3
229

actual VS actual Attack
predict VS
783
36
predict Attack
41
257

Table 5.12: Confusion Matrix for the
Web 2.0 I data set with SFS-SVM feature
selection

Table 5.13: Confusion Matrix for the
Web 2.0 I data set with SFS-J48 feature
selection

As it can be seen from the fourth column in Table 5.29 and Figure 5.9, the probability
of detection of attack when all features are used is 63.00% and with the feature selection
methods such as features with highest InfoGain, features from the nodes of the pruned
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Figure 5.6: 3D scatter plot of clusters of Web sessions from the Web 2.0 I data set
predict VS
predict Attack

actual VS
824
0

actual Attack
111
182

Table 5.14: Confusion Matrix for the
Web 2.0 I data set with sparse K-means
clustering

predict VS
predict Attack

actual VS actual Attack
820
36
4
257

Table 5.15: Confusion Matrix for the Web
2.0 I data set with with features with
highest InfoGain

decision trees, SFS-SVM, SFS-J48, and sparse clustering, the probability of detection of
attack is 87.71%, 87.00%, 78.16%, 87.71%, and 62.12% respectively. This means that when
feature selection is used, the probability of detection of attack increases (except for the sparse
K-means clustering method), which again shows that when the noisy features are expelled,
the K-means algorithm can separate better the attacks from vulnerability scan sessions from
the Web 2.0 I data set.
It should be mentioned that the probability of false alarm is very low, from 0% to 4.98%,
which is very important for the area of attack detection. The balance value is the best when
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features with the highest information gain are used. The overall accuracy of the K-means
for the Web 2.0 I data set with reduced number of features is high, achieving 96.41%. It is
important to note that the probability of attack detection increases from 63% to 87% with
feature selection, and the overall accuracy increases too.

5.6.3

Clustering results for the WebDBAdmin II data set

In this subsection, we present the clustering results for the WebDBAdmin II data set.
Table 5.16 shows the distribution of vulnerability scan and attack sessions for each cluster
when sessions are characterized by all features and when sessions are characterized only by
a few features selected with various techniques.
First, we discuss the resulting clusters of Web sessions which are characterized by all 43
features.
As it can be observed from the ﬁrst row in Table 5.16, only Cluster 6 is labeled as
an attack cluster, whereas in the other clusters vulnerability scan sessions are dominating.
Cluster 6 contains 7 (20.58%) of all the attacks that are labeled as “other attacks”.
Next, we discuss the clusters created when sessions are characterized by the three features
(i.e., Server error, Max length, Median length) with the highest information gain. These
clusters are illustrated in Figure 5.7. Vulnerability scan sessions dominate across all four
clusters. This means that K-means algorithm cannot separate the attacks from vulnerability
scans sessions from the WebDBAdmin II data set. The types of vulnerability scans that are
in Cluster 3 are: 304 (out of 305) sessions that belong to the Static category, all the 19 Dﬁnd
vulnerability scan sessions, and some ﬁngerprinting phpMyAdmin sessions. The majority of
vulnerability scan sessions in Cluster 1 and 2 and 4 belong to the category ﬁngerprinting
phpMyAdmin.
Next, we discuss the performance of the K-means algorithm for the WebDBAdmin II data
set. The confusion matrices given in Tables 5.17, 5.18, 5.19, 5.20, 5.21, and 5.22 show the
actual and predicted attacks and vulnerability scans for the WebDBAdmin II data set, in the
case when K-means used all session features and in the cases when feature selection methods
are used. The ﬁfth column in Table 5.29 shows the probability of detection, probability of

Ana Dimitrijevikj
Dataset
WebDBAdmin II
all features
WebDBAdmin II
feature selection
max InfoGain
WebDBAdmin II
feature selection
from dec.trees
WebDBAdmin II
feature selection
SFS-SVM
WebDBAdmin II
feature selection
SFS-J48
WebDBAdmin II
feature selection
sparse k-means
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Session Type
c1
c2
Vulnerability Scan
13
78
Attack
0
0
Total
13
78
Vulnerability Scan
17
46
Attack
3
4
Total
20
50
Vulnerability Scan
22
5
Attack
2
14
Total
24
19
Vulnerability Scan 513
0
Attack
20
13
Total
533
13
Vulnerability Scan
18
3
Attack
3
3
Total
21
6
Vulnerability Scan 176 166
Attack
21
3
Total
197 169

61

c3
c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 Total
146 160 80 2 17 17
513
12
3
9 7
3
2
36
158 163 89 9 20 19
549
448
2
513
29
0
36
477
2
549
486
513
20
36
506
549
0
513
3
36
3
549
448
44
513
29
1
36
477
45
549
171
513
12
36
183
549

Table 5.16: Summary of Clusters of Web Sessions from the WebDBAdmin II data set

false alarm, precision, balance and overall accuracy when using all features and when using
diﬀerent feature selection methods.
As it can be seen from the Figure 5.9, for the WebDBAdmin II data set, the probability
of detection of attack when all features are used is 19.00% and with the feature selection
methods such as: features with highest InfoGain, features from the nodes of the decision
trees, SFS-SVM, SFS-J48, and sparse clustering, the probability of detection of attack is
0.00%, 38.00%, 44.44%, 8.33%, and 0.00%, respectively. This means that some feature
subsets do not lead to better probability of detection of attack, such as for example the
three features with the highest InfoGain.
The probability of false alarm for WebDBAdmin II is low, around 0%. The overall
accuracy of the K-means for the WebDBAdmin II data set is from 93% to 96%, which is
high because of the dominance of vulnerability scans over attacks. Data set WebDBAdmin
II is an example of achieving high overall accuracy and low probability of detection of attack.
In such cases, using only overall accuracy can be misleading since we have high accuracy up
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to 96% and low probability of detection of attack from 0% to 44%.
One possible explanation why attacks are not typically grouped in separate cluster(s)
(i.e., why the probability of detection is low) in the case of the WebDBAdmin II data set
is the fact that it contains only 36 attacks, out of which 35 are labeled as “other attacks”.
These “other attacks” are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other, and some of them are even
unknown.
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Figure 5.7: 3D scatter plot of clusters of Web sessions from the WebDBAdmin II data set

predict VS
predict Attack

actual VS actual Attack
511
29
2
7

Table 5.17: Confusion Matrix for the
WebDBAdmin II data set with all
features

predict VS
predict Attack

actual VS actual Attack
508
22
5
14

Table 5.18: Confusion Matrix for the
WebDBAdmin II data set with FS from
trees
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actual Attack
20
16

Table 5.19: Confusion Matrix for the
WebDBAdmin II data set with SFS-SVM
feature selection
predict VS
predict Attack

actual VS
513
0

actual Attack
36
0

Table 5.21: Confusion Matrix for the
WebDBAdmin II data set with sparse Kmeans clustering
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predict VS
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actual VS actual Attack
510
33
3
3

Table 5.20: Confusion Matrix for the
WebDBAdmin II data set with SFS-J48
feature selection
predict VS
predict Attack

actual VS actual Attack
513
36
0
0

Table 5.22: Confusion Matrix for the
WebDBAdmin II data set with features
with highest InfoGain

Clustering results for the Web 2.0 II data set

In this subsection, we present the clustering results for data set Web 2.0 II. Table 5.23
shows the distribution of vulnerability scan and attack sessions for each cluster created
when sessions are characterized by all features and when sessions are characterized by a few
features selected with various feature selection techniques.
First, we discuss the resulting clusters of Web sessions characterized by all 43 features.
As it can be observed from the ﬁrst row of Table 5.23, in the case when all features
are used, the majority of session in Clusters 2, 5, 6, and 8 are attacks, whereas in the
other clusters, the dominant type of sessions are vulnerability scans. Cluster 2 contains 471
(33.38%) of all Spam on Blog sessions along with some vulnerability scan sessions such as
ﬁngerprinting Blog (214). In Cluster 5, there are 358 (33.93%) of all Spam on Wiki session
attacks and 40 sessions that are labeled as password cracking Wiki user accounts. Cluster 6
contains 939 (66.54% out of all) Spam on Blog sessions along with some ﬁngerprinting Blog
sessions (345). Cluster 8 contains 560 (53.08%) of all Spam on Wiki along with 18 password
cracking on Wiki accounts sessions. All in all, in the clusters which are labeled as attacks,
the majority of sessions are ether Spam on Blog or Spam on Wiki along with some password
cracking Wiki user accounts.
Next, we examine the clusters when the three features (i.e., POST, Max length, Mean
length) with the highest informational gain are used to characterize the sessions in data
set Web 2.0 II. These clusters are illustrated in the Figure 5.8. The majority of sessions
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in Clusters 1 and 2 are attacks, whereas the majority of sessions in Clusters 3 and 4 are
vulnerability scans. In particular, Cluster 1 contains 1408 (99.78%) of all Spam on Blog
sessions, which are almost all grouped in one cluster. However, Cluster 1 also contains
vulnerability scan sessions that belong to the Blog and/or Wiki category (hence the reason
for false alarms). Next, Cluster 2 contains 90.99% of all Spam on Wiki sessions but also
contains minority of vulnerability scans labeled as Blog and/or Wiki. Almost all the sessions
in Cluster 3 are vulnerability scans from several categories such as Static, Blog, Wiki and so
on. Cluster 4 has majority of vulnerability scans from Wiki and Wiki(home page) category.
It should be noted that most of the sessions in Clusters 3 and 4 (in which the majority are
vulnerability scans) have zero values for the POST feature, whereas for many sessions in
Cluster 1 and 2 (in which attacks are the majority) the POST feature has nonzero values.
Similarly, this phenomenon for the POST feature is also observed for the Web 2.0 I data set.
Next, we discuss the performance of the K-means algorithm by investigating the confusion
matrices given in Tables 5.24, 5.25, 5.26, 5.27, and 5.28, which show the actual and predicted
attacks and vulnerability scans for the Web 2.0 II data set, in the case when K-means is
based on all session features and in the cases when feature selection methods are used. From
the values of these matrices we calculate the probability of detection, probability of false
alarm, precision, balance and overall accuracy.
Dataset
Web 2.0 II
all features
Web 2.0 II
feature selection
max InfoGain
Web 2.0 II
feature selection
SFS-SVM
Web 2.0 II
feature selection
SFS-J48
Web 2.0 II
feature selection
sparse k-means

Session Type
c1
c2
c3
c4
c5
c6
c7
c8 Total
Vulnerability Scan
78
407
139 161
87 656 355 177 2060
Attack
60
506
129
14
407 976
23 610 2725
Total
138
913
268 175
494 1632 378 787 4785
Vulnerability Scan
498
315 1033 214
2060
Attack
1448 1086
1 190
2725
Total
1946 1401 1034 404
4785
Vulnerability Scan
42
1
66 587 1091 273
2060
Attack
33
37
889 230 1219 317
2725
Total
75
38
955 817 2310 590
4785
Vulnerability Scan
353
80 1026 298
2 301
2060
Attack
349
56 1008 429
153 730
2725
Total
702
136 2034 727
155 1031
4785
Vulnerability Scan
494
666
174 210
516
513
Attack
916 1004
595 173
37
36
Total
1410 1670
769 383
553
549

Table 5.23: Summary of Clusters of Web Sessions from the Web 2.0 II data set
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As it can be seen from the last column from Table 5.29 and the Figure 5.9, for the
Web 2.0 II data set, the probability of detection of attack when all features are used is
91.00% and when feature selection methods are used, such as the three features with the
highest InfoGain, SFS-SVM, SFS-J48, and sparse clustering, the probability of detection of
attack is 92.99%, 90.35%, 48.15%, and 92.29%, respectively. It follows that the probability
of detection is somewhat higher or approximately the same for all feature selection methods
except when SVM-J48 is used. The best results for the Web 2.0 II data set in terms of
having low false alarm and high probability of detection are achieved with the three features
that have the highest information gain.
Another observation which can be seen in Figure5.9 is that the Web 2.0 II data set when
compared to the other data sets, has the highest probability of false alarms, in the range of
29.17% to 69.47%. This is because for the Web 2.0 II data set, K-means places vulnerability
scan sessions in clusters in which attacks are the majority. For example, when all session
features are used, in Cluster 2 besides Spam on Blog sessions there are also sessions that are
labeled as Blog, or in clusters in which the dominating sessions are Spam on Wiki there are
also sessions labeled as Wiki. It is obvious that K-means groups spam on Wiki sessions with
Wiki sessions and/or Blog sessions. This is why the Web 2.0 II data set has a high rate of
false alarms.
The Web 2.0 II data set, when compared to the other data sets, has the lowest overall
accuracy from around 57% to 79%.

predict VS
predict Attack

actual VS actual Attack
733
226
1327
2499

Table 5.24: Confusion Matrix for the Web
2.0 II data set with all features

predict VS
predict Attack

actual VS actual Attack
1459
1413
601
1312

Table 5.26: Confusion Matrix for the
Web 2.0 II data set with SFS-J48 feature
selection

predict VS
predict Attack

actual VS actual Attack
629
263
1431
2462

Table 5.25: Confusion Matrix for the Web
2.0 II data set with SFS-SVM FS

predict VS
predict Attack

actual VS actual Attack
726
210
1334
2515

Table 5.27: Confusion Matrix for the Web
2.0 II data set with with sparse K-means
clustering
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Figure 5.8: 3D scatter plot of clusters of Web sessions from the Web 2.0 II data set

predict VS
predict Attack

actual VS actual Attack
1247
191
813
2534

Table 5.28: Confusion Matrix for the Web
2.0 II data set with features with highest
InfoGain

5.7

Summary of Clustering Results

In this section, we give the summary highlights based on the discussions of the clustering
results. Table 5.29 gives the summary of the clustering results for each data set, in the
case when sessions are characterized by all features, and in the cases when sessions are
characterized by a few features selected with various feature selection techniques. (Note
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that the method that gives the best balance value is highlighted in bold, and the method
with worst balance value is highlighted in italic.) Figure 5.9 illustrates the probability of
false alarm vs probability of detection for each data set when all session features are used
and when feature selection methods are used. The following observations can be made:
• As it can be observed from Figure 5.9, and the ﬁrst row of Table 5.29, in the case
when sessions are characterized by all features, the probability of detection of attack
session is the best for the Web 2.0 II data set (91.00%). One possible explanation is
that the Web 2.0 II data set has much more attacks compared to the other data sets.
However, the probability of false alarm is also the biggest for Web 2.0 II whereas for
the others is close to 0%. If we compare all data sets in the case when the sessions are
characterized by all features, the best clustering results are achieved by the Web 2.0 I
data set, in terms of having low false alarms and high probability of detection. (In the
ﬁgure 5.9, the point that is the closest to the ideal point (0,1).)
• From Figure 5.9, and the second row of Table 5.29, one can see that when a feature
selection method based on the three features with the highest information gain is used,
the probability of detection, balance, and overall accuracy increase signiﬁcantly (compared to the case when all features are used) for all data sets, except for WebDBAdmin
II. This is because, as mentioned earlier, the attacks labeled as “other attacks” could
not be grouped in one cluster due to signiﬁcantly diﬀerent characteristics.
• As it can be observed from the the third row of Table 5.29, the number of features
selected from the nodes of the pruned decision trees ranges from three to six. Also,
from Figure 5.9, one can see that when features are selected with this feature selection
method, the probability of detection is increased for all data sets compared to when all
features are used. Also, the overall accuracy is improved, as well as the balance value.
The pruned tree for the Web 2.0 II data set included almost all the features, which is
why we did not use it as a feature selection method for this data set.
• The number of features selected using the Sequential Forward Selection method with
SVM, ranges from three to seven. From Figure 5.9, and the fourth row of Table 5.29,
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one can see that probability of detection is increased for all data sets (except for the
Web 2.0 II data set) compared to when all features are used. It appears that for the
Web 2.0 II data set, some Spam on Wiki attack sessions are misclassiﬁed. Also, the
overall accuracy is improved except for the Web 2.0 II data set.
• The number of features selected using the Sequential Forward Selection method with
J48, ranges from two to six. With this feature selection method, as shown in Figure 5.9,
and the ﬁfth row of Table 5.29, the probability of detection and the overall accuracy
are increased for WebDBAdmin I and the Web 2.0 I data sets compared to when all
features are used.
• When Sparse K-means clustering method proposed in [48] is used, the probability of
detection is only improved for the Web 2.0 II data set. The overall accuracy of the
sparse K-means clustering is the same as when all session features are used.
• It appears that data set Web 2.0 I has the highest balance value compared to the other
data sets (in the case when all features are used, and when features are selected with
any method). This can also be observed in Figure 5.9, since all the points for the Web
2.0 I data set are close to the ideal point of (0,1). This means that this data set has
low probability of false alarm and high probability of detection of attacks. Apparently,
attacks and vulnerability scans sessions in the Web 2.0 I data set can be well separated.
• The WebDBAdmin II data set has the lowest balance value compared to the other
data sets (especially when features are selected with any method). The WebDBAdmin
II data set has very low probability of detection of attacks (see Figure 5.9) when
compared to the other data sets. Clearly, the attack and vulnerability scan sessions in
the WebDBAdmin II data set cannot be well separated due to the signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
nature of attacks that belong to this data set.
One general conclusion that can be drawn from the clustering results is that using feature
selection methods typically helps to better separate attack Web sessions from vulnerability
scan Web sessions. One intuitive explanation is that when redundant and noisy features are
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removed from the data sets, the K-means not only works faster, but it gives better results
in terms of separating attacks from vulnerability scan sessions.
Another conclusion is that using only the overall accuracy to measure the performance
of clustering may be misleading, especially if the data set has uneven class distributions. In
that case, using other measures such as probability of detection, probability of false alarm,
precision, and balance can be used so that one can understand the results better. For
example, the WebDBAdmin II data set has high overall accuracy, but low probability of
detection.
Typically, cluster analysis can eﬀectively separate attacks from vulnerability scans of
malicious Web traﬃc, especially if important features are used to characterize the Web
sessions. However, the extent of the improvement when only a few important features are
used to characterize the sessions depends on the data set and its sessions.

Ana Dimitrijevikj

Chapter 5. Cluster Analysis of malicious Web Sessions

all features

#
fs-max InfoGain

#

fs -nodes trees

#

SFS-SVM

#

SFS-J48

#

sparse clust

k
pd
pf
prec
bal
acc
of features
k
pd
pf
prec
bal
acc
of features
selected
features
k
pd
pf
prec
bal
acc
of features
selected
features
k
pd
pf
prec
bal
acc
of features
selected
features
k
pd
pf
prec
bal
acc
of features
selected
features
k
pd
pf
prec
bal
acc

WebDBAdmin I
3
17.00%
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4
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Table 5.29: Summary of Clustering Results for all data sets
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this thesis we presented an empirical analysis of attacker activities on Web-based
systems with a typical three-tier architecture. The analysis was based on data collected
by high-interaction honeypots, during a period of almost four months. The Web applications running on our honeypots included phpMyAdmin, and Web 2.0 applications such as
WordPress and Mediawiki. The data collected through the application traﬃc logs from our
honeypots was grouped into four data sets: WebDBAdmin I, Web 2.0 I, WebDBAdmin II,
and Web 2.0 II. The data is in a form of Web Sessions, each deﬁned as a sequence of requests
issued from the same user during a single visit to the Web System. We characterize each
session with 43 diﬀerent features. Our analysis distinguished between attack sessions and
vulnerability scans sessions on the Web-based systems.
The work in this thesis aims to quantify attacker activities which is not a common practice
in the cyber security area. The contributions of our work include (1) modeling some features
of the malicious Web traﬃc and (2) cluster analysis of malicious Web traﬃc.
In the feature modeling part of this thesis we analyzed three features of malicious Web
sessions: Number of Requests per session, Bytes transferred per session, and Duration. We
also analyzed the number of requests and number of sessions per unique attacker. Only a
few attempts were made in the past to statistically model some aspects of malicious traﬃc;
however, neither of the related work included modeling the features of malicious Web sessions,
especially from Web 2.0 applications.
Potentially, there is a signiﬁcant beneﬁt from statistical modeling of the malicious traﬃc.
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For example, these models can be used for simulation of realistic malicious traﬃc for the
purpose of veriﬁcation and validation of systems’ security or to help the intrusion detection
process.
The most important observations that we made based on the feature modeling part of
this thesis are as follows:
• Features of malicious sessions such as Number of requests, Bytes transferred, and Duration follow skewed distributions, including heavy-tailed. This means that most of the
observed malicious Web sessions were short, with a small number of requests and bytes
transferred. However, there were sessions that had at least one of these three features
with large values. These large values formed the tail of the corresponding feature.
This practically means that malicious sessions with extremely large number of request
and/or bytes transferred and/or duration can happen with non-negligible probability.
It should be mentioned that we did not observe sessions that had signiﬁcantly large
values for all three features.
• Number of requests per unique attacker, as well as the number of sessions per unique
attacker follow skewed distributions, including heavy-tailed, with a small number of
attackers submitting most of the malicious traﬃc. Practically, this means that a large
number of requests to the honeypot originated from a few attackers. These kind of
attackers appeared rarely, but they generated the majority of the malicious Web traﬃc.
• The Number of request per session, Bytes transferred per session, and Session duration
had positive pairwise correlations. The positive correlation was mainly due to the large
number of short sessions with small number of requests and bytes transferred.
• We observed diﬀerences between the features of malicious Web sessions across all data
sets, and these variations were statistically signiﬁcant and non-random. This behavior
may be expected due to the fact that honeypots had diﬀerent conﬁgurations and the
data was collected in diﬀerent periods.
The second part of this thesis included cluster analysis of malicious Web traﬃc. Not
many clustering analysis studies have been done for malicious traﬃc. Most of the related
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work studies did cluster analysis on non-malicious network traﬃc, or cluster analysis on data
sets that had both malicious and non-malicious traﬃc for the purpose of intrusion detection.
We used cluster analysis to explore whether attack and vulnerability scan Web sessions could
be separated into diﬀerent clusters. Some potential beneﬁts from this cluster analysis include
identifying attacks within malicious Web traﬃc consisting of many vulnerability scans and
attacks, which is important because attacks are more critical events. Also, cluster analysis
helps the process of knowledge discovery on the characteristics of the malicious Web traﬃc,
and thus contributes towards better understanding of the types of malicious behaviors.
The most signiﬁcant observations from the cluster analysis of malicious Web traﬃc are
as follows:
• Feature selection methods typically helped to better separate attacks from vulnerability
scan Web sessions. One intuitive explanation is that when feature selection expelled
features that were redundant and noisy, better results were archived by the cluster
analysis. However, the extent of the improvement depended on the data set and its
sessions.
• Typically, the performance of the K-means algorithm measured in overall accuracy
was very high for all data sets. However, one insight from our analysis was that
using only overall accuracy can be misleading, especially if the data set has uneven
class distributions. In our case, most of the data sets had much more vulnerability
scans than attacks. For one data set speciﬁcally, the overall accuracy was high but
the probability of attack detection was low. Therefore, using additional measures of
performance for the K-means such as probability of detection of attack, probability
of false alarm, balance and precision can be useful for better comprehension of the
clustering results.
Our future work includes further investigation of the performance of several other clustering algorithms such as EM (Expectation-Maximization) clustering, and hierarchial clustering. We also plan to do more formal comparison of the performance of diﬀerent combinations
of clustering algorithms and feature selection methods.
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